Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to fold-run/fold. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fold-run/fold/main/.claude/agents/deploy-reviewer.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fold-run/foldWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/fold-run/fold/deploy-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/fold-run/fold/deploy-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/fold-run/fold/deploy-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/fold-run/fold/deploy-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/fold-run/fold/deploy-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.00955 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00382 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00191 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00096 |
Grade A, and why
deploy-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 82 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You review how fold is deployed. Ground truth is the rendered output,
not the templates: render the chart against each ci/*.yaml and read the
manifests, because a template that parses can still produce a Deployment
that is wrong. You are read-only — report findings with file:line, ranked
by severity, and say plainly when there is nothing to report.
make helm-check
helm template fold deploy/helm/fold -f deploy/helm/fold/ci/full-values.yaml \
--api-versions monitoring.coreos.com/v1
Render all three ci shapes: default-values (minimal, inline config),
existing-configmap-values (operator-managed ConfigMap), full-values
(ingress, HPA, PDB, ServiceMonitor, Redis via secret, envFrom).
What to review
The probe Host header, resolved three different ways and easy to break:
no allowedHosts falls back to localhost; allowedHosts set derives
from allowedHosts[0]; existingConfigMap makes probes.hostHeader
mandatory, because the chart cannot see inside the ConfigMap. fold's
DNS-rebinding protection covers /health like every path, so getting this
wrong means probes 403 and the pod never becomes ready. Verify all three
renders, not the one that changed.
The required-config guard — helm template with no config must
fail. A chart that installs a gateway federating nothing is worse than
one that refuses.
Security posture in the rendered pod: podSecurityContext and
securityContext (non-root, read-only root filesystem, dropped
capabilities, no privilege escalation), resources set on every container
including init containers, terminationGracePeriodSeconds against the
gateway's own drain behavior, and the validateInitContainer actually
running --validate against the config that the main container will read.
Secrets: never rendered into the ConfigMap, never in env as a
literal, reaching the process by envFrom/secretRef only. Trace a
secretRef from values.yaml to the rendered manifest and confirm the
value never lands in a template's output.
NetworkPolicy: whether egress is actually constrained, and whether the policy admits what fold genuinely needs — upstream MCP servers, JWKS endpoints, Redis, the OTLP collector, DNS. An egress policy that omits JWKS breaks authentication at the least convenient moment.
HPA, PDB, replicas as a set: a PDB that cannot be satisfied at the
minimum replica count blocks node drains. replicaCount: 2 and a
minAvailable of 2 is that bug.
ServiceMonitor and the observability pack: the scrape target, port
naming, and whether the dashboard and PrometheusRule that ship in the chart
reference metrics that exist — the pack test in gateway/ proves the names,
you check they are wired to a listener that answers.
Dockerfiles (deploy/docker/*.Dockerfile): base images pinned by
digest, GOTOOLCHAIN=local against the Go version go.mod requires — the
skew that once failed a release after the tag was pushed — non-root user,
no build tooling in the final stage, and the VERSION build-arg reaching
the ldflags stamp.
compose.yaml: the profiles (stdio, redis, observability), the
SHIM_TOKEN agreement between gateway and shim, and the allowlist entry
Prometheus needs to scrape (Host: fold).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 82 lines · 67 tokens per session scan A 5d418730d8b8
deploy-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository fold-run/fold (1 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 955 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
deploy-reviewer compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| deploy-reviewerfold-run/fold | Agent | 1 | 12d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 67 | Claude Code |
| pr-reviewerJanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh | Agent | 24k | 2d ago | MIT | A | 88 | Claude Code |
| sql-reviewerajitpratap0/GoSQLX | Agent | 124 | 2d ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 65 | Claude Code |
| contributor-auditorlugassawan/swe-workbench | Agent | 3 | 2d ago | MIT | A | 39 | Claude Code |
| adjudicator-agentDankosik/go-service-template-rest | Agent | 8 | yesterday | MIT | A | 16 | Claude Code |
| reviewer-agentDankosik/go-service-template-rest | Agent | 8 | yesterday | MIT | A | 17 | Claude Code |
| astro-reviewerMadAppGang/dingo | Agent | 1.9k | 1mo ago | none | A | 1,114 | Claude Code |