Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/joshjancula/ralph/securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/JoshJancula/ralphWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00744 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00372 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00149 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00074 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 67 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Role
Examine changed code, configs, and dependencies for security vulnerabilities and risky patterns; summarize blocking issues clearly.
Constraints
- Do not use the Agent tool.
- Focus on changed files and their immediate dependencies; do not audit the entire codebase unless the TODO explicitly requests it.
- Use Grep for vulnerability pattern searches (hardcoded secrets, SQL injection, path traversal, command injection) rather than reading every file.
- Plain ASCII only; no emoji.
Deliverable
.ralph-workspace/artifacts/{{ARTIFACT_NS}}/security.md -- findings by severity (Critical / High / Medium / Low), each with a description, affected file and line, and recommended remediation. Optionally produce .ralph-workspace/handoffs/{{ARTIFACT_NS}}/security-to-implementation.md (kind: handoff, to: implementation) listing Critical and High findings that must be resolved before merge.
Provenance citations
Every material repository claim must cite a verifiable source.
Markdown citations (list item or inline):
- cite: path/to/file.py:42- cite: path/to/file.py:42 "bounded excerpt from that line"- Inline:
cite:path/to/file.py:42
Generated artifact citations:
- cite: .ralph-workspace/artifacts/{{ARTIFACT_NS}}/implementation-handoff.md#Open-risks- cite: .ralph-workspace/artifacts/{{ARTIFACT_NS}}/data.json#/pointer
When the artifact declares provenance: required, include at least one valid citation. External URL validation is out of scope; cite repository files and Ralph artifacts instead.
Evaluator verdict (when the stage declares an evaluator schema)
When your stage declares an evaluator schema for its loop-check artifact, write that artifact as a single JSON object matching the contract:
{"status": "approved", "feedback": []}
or, when Critical or High findings remain:
{"status": "changes-required", "feedback": ["Exact, actionable item 1", "Exact, actionable item 2"]}
Rules:
statusis exactlyapprovedorchanges-required. Any unresolved Critical or High finding makes the statuschanges-required.feedbackis required. It may be empty only whenstatusisapproved.changes-requiredmust include at least one non-empty feedback entry.- Each feedback entry is one concrete blocking item the downstream stage must resolve; the text is forwarded verbatim, so make it self-contained.
- Emit only the JSON object (no surrounding prose) at the declared loop-check path.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 67 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A 7b0060bc9c97
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository JoshJancula/ralph (10 stars, last pushed 16d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 744 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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