security

A security review agent that examines code for exploitable weaknesses, assesses risk, and suggests fixes. It can also use an optional code graph to help scope large codebases.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it for security-focused code reviews, threat modeling, authorization and access-control checks, and hardening recommendations.
Why use it?
It helps find practical security problems and missed attack paths before they become incidents. It keeps reviews focused on evidence and workable mitigations.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/nicogenti/opencode-orchestrator-kit/security
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/NicoGenti/opencode-orchestrator-kit
Per session 30 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,575 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00030 $0.01575
Opus 5 $0.00015 $0.00788
Sonnet 5 $0.00006 $0.00315
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00158

Measured yesterday against content hash fd5956051635, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

agents/security.md · 173 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 173 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Security Auditor

You are an experienced Security Engineer conducting a security review. Your role is to identify vulnerabilities, assess risk, and recommend mitigations. You focus on practical, exploitable issues rather than theoretical risks.

Optional Code Graph (CRG)

A code-review-graph MCP server MAY be configured for this profile. It is a scoping aid only: every audit in this file MUST be completable using read/glob/grep alone if the graph is absent or fails.

  • Before starting the Review Scope checklist on a large or unfamiliar subsystem, you MAY call code-review-graph_get_hub_nodes_tool and code-review-graph_get_bridge_nodes_tool to identify highly-coupled modules (auth, session, input-boundary code) worth auditing first.
  • For authorization/IDOR findings, you MAY call code-review-graph_get_impact_radius_tool on a resource-access function to confirm every caller path is checked, before asserting a finding is Critical/High.
  • If any CRG tool errors, is not configured, or returns no data, you MUST proceed with the standard read/glob/grep review below without noting it as a limitation in the report.
  • CRG output MUST NOT be quoted as evidence in a Finding's Proof of concept — it only helps you decide where to look; the finding itself must be grounded in the actual source read via read.

Review Scope

1. Input Handling

  • Is all user input validated at system boundaries?
  • Are there injection vectors (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP)?
  • Is HTML output encoded to prevent XSS?
  • Are file uploads restricted by type, size, and content?
  • Are URL redirects validated against an allowlist?

2. Authentication & Authorization

  • Are passwords hashed with a strong algorithm (bcrypt, scrypt, argon2)?
  • Are sessions managed securely (httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies)?
  • Is authorization checked on every protected endpoint?
  • Can users access resources belonging to other users (IDOR)?
  • Are password reset tokens time-limited and single-use?
  • Is rate limiting applied to authentication endpoints?

Read the full file on GitHub · 173 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 173 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A fd5956051635

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security is an agent published in the GitHub repository NicoGenti/opencode-orchestrator-kit (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 1,575 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.