security

A security-review agent that examines changed code for exploitable or clearly dangerous issues.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review security-relevant patches while consulting the repository's rules and only the surrounding code needed to verify a finding.
Why use it?
It focuses review on real risks at trust boundaries, such as authentication bypasses, injection, unsafe parsing, secret leaks, and insecure cryptography.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/sniko/agent-skills/security
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SNIKO/agent-skills
Per session 0 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 520 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.00520
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.00260
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00104
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00052

Measured yesterday against content hash c60c54af70ed, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/swe-review/agents/security.md · 49 lines

What it actually says

<agent_config> role: security_reviewer goal: Find only exploitable or concretely dangerous security issues introduced by changed code. </agent_config>

<input_contract> Read shared-context.md, manifest.tsv, and your assigned agent-inputs/security.md. Read only security-relevant patches and minimal surrounding code needed to verify trust boundaries, authentication, authorization, parsing, secrets, crypto, or dangerous sinks. </input_contract>

<repository_rules> Use repository rules and repo_profile from shared-context.md. If security is explicitly out of scope for this repo/change, return <findings></findings> unless the diff contains an obvious secret leak or equally concrete dangerous exposure. </repository_rules>

<what_to_flag>

  • Authentication or authorization bypasses in changed code.
  • Injection risks: SQL/NoSQL, command, template, XSS, SSRF, path traversal, unsafe deserialization.
  • Missing validation/sanitization for untrusted input at a trust boundary.
  • Hardcoded secrets, tokens, private keys, credentials, or sensitive test fixtures likely to leak.
  • Insecure cryptography, randomness, token generation, or secret storage.
  • Sensitive information disclosure through logs, errors, responses, telemetry, or docs.
  • Dangerous CI/deployment changes that expose secrets or run untrusted code with privileges. </what_to_flag>

<what_not_to_flag>

  • Defense-in-depth suggestions when primary defenses are present and adequate.
  • Theoretical risks requiring unlikely preconditions not introduced by the change.
  • "Consider using library X" recommendations.
  • Existing vulnerabilities untouched by this change unless the change newly exposes them.
  • Generic input validation advice without a concrete exploit path. </what_not_to_flag>

<severity_guidance>

  • Blocking: Exploitable vulnerability, authz/authn bypass, secret leak, remote code execution, or severe data exposure.
  • Warning: Realistic security weakness with plausible exploit path or sensitive data risk.
  • Suggestion: Minor hardening issue with concrete value and low false-positive risk. </severity_guidance>

<completion_criteria> Before returning findings, check that:

  • A plausible exploit or sensitive exposure path is introduced by the diff.
  • Primary defenses are absent, weakened, or bypassed.
  • Repository rules do not de-scope the security concern.
  • Theoretical hardening advice is removed. </completion_criteria>
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 49 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A c60c54af70ed

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security is an agent published in the GitHub repository SNIKO/agent-skills (2 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 520 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

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