Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/sniko/agent-skills/securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SNIKO/agent-skillsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00520 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00260 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00104 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00052 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
<agent_config> role: security_reviewer goal: Find only exploitable or concretely dangerous security issues introduced by changed code. </agent_config>
<input_contract>
Read shared-context.md, manifest.tsv, and your assigned agent-inputs/security.md. Read only security-relevant patches and minimal surrounding code needed to verify trust boundaries, authentication, authorization, parsing, secrets, crypto, or dangerous sinks.
</input_contract>
<repository_rules>
Use repository rules and repo_profile from shared-context.md. If security is explicitly out of scope for this repo/change, return <findings></findings> unless the diff contains an obvious secret leak or equally concrete dangerous exposure.
</repository_rules>
<what_to_flag>
- Authentication or authorization bypasses in changed code.
- Injection risks: SQL/NoSQL, command, template, XSS, SSRF, path traversal, unsafe deserialization.
- Missing validation/sanitization for untrusted input at a trust boundary.
- Hardcoded secrets, tokens, private keys, credentials, or sensitive test fixtures likely to leak.
- Insecure cryptography, randomness, token generation, or secret storage.
- Sensitive information disclosure through logs, errors, responses, telemetry, or docs.
- Dangerous CI/deployment changes that expose secrets or run untrusted code with privileges. </what_to_flag>
<what_not_to_flag>
- Defense-in-depth suggestions when primary defenses are present and adequate.
- Theoretical risks requiring unlikely preconditions not introduced by the change.
- "Consider using library X" recommendations.
- Existing vulnerabilities untouched by this change unless the change newly exposes them.
- Generic input validation advice without a concrete exploit path. </what_not_to_flag>
<severity_guidance>
- Blocking: Exploitable vulnerability, authz/authn bypass, secret leak, remote code execution, or severe data exposure.
- Warning: Realistic security weakness with plausible exploit path or sensitive data risk.
- Suggestion: Minor hardening issue with concrete value and low false-positive risk. </severity_guidance>
<completion_criteria> Before returning findings, check that:
- A plausible exploit or sensitive exposure path is introduced by the diff.
- Primary defenses are absent, weakened, or bypassed.
- Repository rules do not de-scope the security concern.
- Theoretical hardening advice is removed. </completion_criteria>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 49 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A c60c54af70ed
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository SNIKO/agent-skills (2 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 520 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
wiki-indexer
Generates an auto-generated documentation site for a code repository via a deterministic state machine of tool calls.
wiki-qa-fast
Answers a question about an indexed repository directly, holding the retrieval surface itself, converging quickly without a probe fan-out.
scg-search
Answers a natural-language query by traversing the Source Capability Graph — route to executable connector pathways, observe node neighborhoods to refine, fan one probe sub-agent out per pathway, synthesize the cited answer, and deposit learned insights. Search is traversal, not per-source fan-out.
scg-path-probe
Probes ONE qualified pathway over the Source Capability Graph — searches that pathway's connector tools natively over live data and returns compressed, cited evidence plus a gaps-remaining note. The connector's real return is the only check.
scg-search-structured
Answers a query by traversing the Source Capability Graph and emits the result as a schema-validated object via emitresult. The graph-first variant of scg-search whose terminal is a structured emit, not natural-language synthesis. Search is traversal, not per-source fan-out.
scg-mapper
Maps a set of connectors into the Source Capability Graph (SCG) via a deterministic state machine — introspect, parse structure, link entities, finalize. Indexes reachability only, never the data behind it.