Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/bogzx/seeks/whygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Bogzx/seeksWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00813 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00407 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00163 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00081 |
Grade A, and why
why scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Run shell via the Bash tool. This is read-only — it never edits loop state.
Every PreToolUse verdict, every Stop-gate verdict and every hook crash is appended to .seeks/run/<name>/decisions.jsonl. That file is hook-owned (the edit tools and Bash are both denied at that path) — this command is the sanctioned way to read it.
-
Pick the loop (
<name>).$0if it looks like a loop name, elsenode "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/seeks.mjs" latest. If none, say there are no loops and STOP. -
Replay.
node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/bin/seeks.mjs" why <name>— pass through any of the user's flags:--denied— only the denials (the usual question: "why did that get blocked?")--crashes— only hook crashes. Check this first when the guardrails seem not to be firing: the hooks are fail-open by design, so a crashed hook allows everything silently. A non-empty list here means enforcement was off for those calls.--last N(default 20),--tool Bash|Edit|Write,--rule <id>,--hook pre-tool|stop-gate,--json
-
Explain the verdict in plain language, keyed on the
ruleid — don't just paste the log:rule what it means what to do instead git-pushpush/merge/rebase is denied at every level delivery is seeks deliverat L3; otherwise the human mergesl1-commit/l1-editthe loop is L1 = report-only write findings under .seeks/run/<name>/; ask the user to re-run at L2 to change codehook-ownedthe command touched status.json/hook-state.json/decisions.jsonluse seeks status-get/status-set/whydenylistthe path matched the secret/ .gitdenylistthat file is out of bounds; if it's a false positive the user can rename it or widen denylistin the loop's statusoutside-worktreethe edit left the loop's worktree work inside the worktree only strict-bashSEEKS_STRICT_BASHis on and the command's head wasn't allowlisteduse an allowlisted tool, or the user adds it via strict_bash_allowwrap-upthe time budget is spent only the seeks CLI, git add/commitand run-dir writes remain — writesummary.mdand end the turnstop:*the Stop gate released the loop ( done,max_iters,time-budget,stuck,needs_human)that is why the loop ended hook-crasha hook threw and failed open — enforcement was NOT applied for that call surface the error verbatim and suggest /seeks:doctor, then/seeks:exportfor a bug report -
If the user asked about one specific action, quote the matching line(s) and answer the actual question. If nothing matches, say so plainly rather than guessing — an empty log means the hooks never ran for that loop (check
/seeks:doctor).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 29 lines · 15 tokens per session scan A e41a7bd9b286
why is a command published in the GitHub repository Bogzx/seeks (4 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 15 tokens to every session and 813 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
nio
Nio — scan code, evaluate an action, read the audit report, manage config.
hs
Hardstop - Pre-execution safety layer for shell commands. Shows status and help.
log
Show Hardstop audit log entries.
off
Disable Hardstop protection temporarily.
skip
Skip Hardstop safety check for the next command only.
status
Show Hardstop current status and statistics.