Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/monitorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProofWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00579 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00290 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00116 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00058 |
Grade A, and why
monitor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 65 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/monitor — post-deployment watch setup
Auditing finds bugs before launch; monitoring catches the rug after launch. This command turns a contract into a concrete alerting plan and checks whether anything alarming has already happened on-chain.
Procedure
Step 1 — Detect capabilities
From the source (or a deployed address via block-explorer), determine what the
contract can do: hasOwner (Ownable/AccessControl), hasProxy (EIP-1967 — use
mcp__block-explorer__resolve_proxy), hasPause, hasRoles, hasMint.
Step 2 — Recommend monitors
mcp__monitoring__suggest_monitors(hasOwner=true, hasProxy=true, hasPause=true)
Returns prioritized monitors (event signature + topic0 + severity + why). Wire
these into your alerting stack (Forta, OpenZeppelin Defender, Tenderly alerts, or
a self-hosted log watcher keyed on the topic0s).
Step 3 — Scan what already happened
For a deployed address, flag any high-severity events in recent history:
mcp__monitoring__scan_recent(chain=<chain>, address=<addr>)
Flags Upgraded, OwnershipTransferred, AdminChanged, Paused. Offline (or
with no RPC) it returns a labeled sample.
Output
Monitoring plan for 0xVault… (ethereum)
Recommended alerts (5):
[critical] Ownership transfer OwnershipTransferred(address,address)
[critical] Implementation upgrade Upgraded(address)
[high] Contract paused Paused(address)
[high] Large transfer Transfer(...) (threshold: > 5% TVL)
[medium] Contract unpaused Unpaused(address)
Recent activity scan (last 5000 blocks):
⚠ [critical] Upgraded(address) at block 0x10a2b3c — implementation changed, re-audit
Wire topic0 filters into Forta / Defender / Tenderly. Re-run /audit-live after any upgrade.
Notes
- Pair with
/pre-deploy— monitoring is a launch-checklist item. - A fired
Upgraded/AdminChangedshould trigger an immediate/audit-liveof the new implementation. - Set transfer thresholds relative to TVL, not absolute — see [[centralization-risk]].
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 65 lines · 25 tokens per session scan A 415b9c2593bd
monitor is a command published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (9 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 579 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
phase6-start
Command "phase6-start" from kota1026/quantum-shield, covering phase 6 $arguments 開始, step 1: 進捗状況を確認, step 2: 未完了画面を特定, step 3: 必須ファイルを読み込む and step 4: インフラ確認.
codespace-verify
Command "codespace-verify" from kota1026/quantum-shield, covering codespaces ui確認コマンド, 1. codespaces起動確認, サービス起動状態確認, postgresql, redis, rabbitmqが起動していない場合 and フロントエンド起動.
pr-merge
Command "pr-merge" from kota1026/quantum-shield, covering pr作成・マージコマンド, 1. 変更確認, 2. コミット（未コミットがある場合）, 3. pr作成 and 4. マージ.
krait-fuzz
Run an invariant-based fuzzing campaign: Understand → Extract Invariants → Generate Foundry Tests → Run & Fix Iteratively → Report.
krait-poc
Write and run a valid Foundry proof-of-concept that proves (or disproves) a Solidity exploit by asserting the actual harm on a forked chain or against local source.
worktree-check
Audit every git worktree for uncommitted, unpushed, or stashed work at risk before any reset/merge/cleanup. Usage: /worktree-check.