Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/solanabr/auditor-skillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/solanabr/auditor-skill/patch)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/solanabr/auditor-skill/patch"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/solanabr/auditor-skill/patch/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/solanabr/auditor-skill/patch"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/solanabr/auditor-skill/patch.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.01143 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.00457 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00229 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00114 |
Grade A, and why
auditor:patch scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 40 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
auditor-skill — Patch Draft & Verification
Arguments: $ARGUMENTS
Produce a verified fix proposal for a confirmed finding. Read OUTPUT-RULES.md first (severity 1-10, Rule 5b) and the finding's block + its audit_<n>/poc/F-xxx harness (the executed exploit the fix must now defeat). The patch is a deliverable, not an application — the auditor never writes to the client's real tree; it stays read-only on the target and hands back a diff plus a verification record.
Steps
-
Resolve the finding. Read the finding block from
audit_<n>/REPORT.md, its context worksheet underworksheets/context/*, and itspoc/F-xxxcrate if/auditor:pocalready ran. Pin the audited commit — the diff must apply against that commit, notHEAD. -
Spawn
patch-engineer. It writesaudit_<n>/patches/F-xxx.patch: a minimal, idiomatic unified diff that closes exactly the cited reachability/bound — no refactor, no drive-by cleanup, nothing beyond the one guard/bound the finding names. It obeys.claude/rules/{rust,anchor,pinocchio}.md: checked arithmetic (checked_add/checked_sub/…), stored canonical bumps (never recalculated),transfer_checked(not deprecatedtransfer), nounwrap()/expect()in program code, validated CPI targets. A cosmetic edit that does not move the Rule 5b bound is not a fix. -
Verify by execution (mandatory for [FIX-VERIFIED]). Apply the patch to a scratch git worktree (never the client checkout), rebuild, and re-run the finding's
poc/F-xxxexploit. The exploit must now revert / fail on the patched build — the previously-succeedingvulnerablepath is closed. Reading the diff is not verification; only an executed revert earns[FIX-VERIFIED]. If no executable PoC exists, the ceiling is[FIX-PROPOSED](verified by re-derivation, not by execution). -
Mutation + blast-radius (optional). With
--verify-with-mutation, runmewtmutation on the patched line(s) via Trail of Bitsmutation-testing(references/orchestration/boundary-map.md) — an uncaught mutant on the fix means the guard is under-tested, so record it and do not overstate the verification. Always run adifferential-reviewblast-radius check (Trail of Bits): apply the same diff-vs-behavior comparison to confirm the fix closes the exploit path and leaves every other path unchanged — a fix that breaks an adjacent instruction is[FIX-INSUFFICIENT].
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 40 lines · 94 tokens per session scan A d3a783764ed4
auditor:patch is a command published in the GitHub repository solanabr/auditor-skill (59 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 1,143 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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