sieve AGENTS.md

A repository instruction file for Codex, describing how to work on Sieve, a local Rust program that checks traffic between AI coding agents and language models before sensitive crypto actions.

In plain words
What is it for?
Following the project's architecture, tests, documentation priorities, and strict security constraints when changing its code.
Why use it?
It gives the agent one agreed set of rules and source documents, reducing conflicting instructions and unsafe changes.

Instructions file for CodexOpenCode

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add instructions/sieveai-dev/sieve/agents-md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SieveAI-dev/sieve

Made for: Codex, OpenCode.

Per session 3,562 This file is loaded in full into every session.
When invoked 3,562 The same file — it is already loaded in full.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.03562 $0.03562
Opus 5 $0.01781 $0.01781
Sonnet 5 $0.00712 $0.00712
Haiku 4.5 $0.00356 $0.00356

Measured 2d ago against content hash 6c27b9a43c18, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

sieve AGENTS.md scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

AGENTS.md · 187 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 187 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

AGENTS.md

This file provides guidance to Codex (Codex.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.


项目一句话

Sieve 是一个完全本地运行的 LLM 流量代理(Rust 单二进制),夹在 AI 编码 agent(Claude Code / OpenClaw / Hermes / Codex CLI)和上游模型之间,对 crypto 开发者做双向安全检测,在不可逆动作(签名 / 转账 / 部署)前强制插入认知摩擦。

项目状态

早期预览(0.1.0-alpha)。Cargo workspace 8 crate(sieve-core / sieve-rules / sieve-policy / sieve-cli / sieve-ipc / sieve-hook / sieve-updater / sieve-testing)+ fuzz crate;sigstore + 可复现构建 CI 在跑。能力面:双向检测、四路由内容类型对等覆盖、出站 exfil 链与 canary 诱饵检测、WIF/xprv 私钥格式检测、配置化路由表 [[upstream.routes]]、ProviderCodec 协议分层、四家 agent 接入。源码在 crates/ 下,文档与代码已对齐。


Source of Truth 层级

文档冲突时按以下优先级裁决(高 → 低):

  1. IPC 协议规格docs/specs/SPEC-005-ipc-protocol.md(IPC wire schema 唯一权威源)+ 其余 docs/specs/ 功能规格
  2. 架构 / 数据模型docs/design/architecture.md + docs/design/data-model.md
  3. API / 部署 / 开发指南docs/api/ + docs/guides/
  4. README + .cursorrules — 项目入口与代码规范

约束:

  • 改 IPC 字段先改 SPEC-005,再落代码
  • 术语首次出现先去 docs/glossary.md 加条目,再在 SPEC 引用

不可放宽的硬约束(十六条 / .cursorrules §二)

任何 PR / 设计变更触碰以下任一条,默认拒绝,必须先和用户显式确认才能放宽:

  1. Rust 栈非选项 —— Go regexp 慢 1000 倍;hot loop 不允许引入非 Rust 二进制依赖
  2. 绝不联网做 verifier —— 任何外部 token / 签名 / 规则的远端校验都摧毁产品定位
  3. fail-closed High-Risk Tool Policy Gate —— 签名 / shell / 敏感路径的 Critical 工具调用强制人工确认,YOLO mode 不可关
  4. BIP39 必须做 SHA-256 checksum 验证 —— 仅词表匹配不足以定级 Critical(Sieve 差异化点)
  5. SSE 边界处理 fuzz test 全覆盖 —— 半行 chunk / 跨 chunk 分隔符 / C0 控制字符 / 多 event 粘包 / 提前断流,PR 不带 fuzz 不合并
  6. 自身供应链 sigstore + reproducible build + pinned deps —— Tier 1(macOS / Linux)Week 1 起强制;Windows 为 Tier 2
  7. Critical 拦截 FP < 0.5% —— 超过即用户禁用产品
  8. Critical 在所有版本(含降级模式)不可关闭 —— 产品安全承诺,不是用户偏好
  9. 适配四家 agent:Claude Code / OpenClaw / Hermes / Codex CLI —— UnifiedMessage 真实运行时支持 Anthropic Messages API + OpenAI Chat Completions 双协议;Codex CLI 走原生 PreToolUse hook(~/.codex/hooks.json)经 IPC judge_tool_call 取裁决,OpenClaw / Hermes 两家 hook 作 UX 层、安全不变量由网关 inbound_hold 兜底 fail-closed;其他协议(Gemini / Mistral 等)推 Phase 2
  10. GA 一次性公开 repo + 代码 + 文档 —— sigstore CI pipeline 照常跑通
  11. 不在 Anthropic API 协议层撒谎 —— 不伪造 tool_use / stop_reason / id / usage / type;拦截发生时允许截 SSE 流注入 sieve_blocked event(Sieve 自报事件,不是冒充模型);keep-alive comment 行 : keep-alive\n\n 不属于伪造
  12. 不装本地 CA 做 MITM —— Network Extension / 本地 CA 注入 / 系统 proxy 修改推 Phase 3 选购,Phase 1/2 不做
  13. 出站脱敏不打断工作流 —— OUT-01~05/12 高频脱敏类必须自动脱敏 + 状态栏 5s 通知,不弹窗;每天弹几十次的产品没人用
  14. 用户规则系统 fail-safe(v2.0)—— 用户规则文件加载失败 / pattern 编译失败 / 安全 lint 拒绝 → daemon 必须正常启动 + 系统规则全功能;用户规则不能 override 或 suppress 系统 Critical;用户规则只能 High Ask/Warn/Mark,不能 Block / HookTerminal。详见 LayeredEngine 合并顺序
  15. 行为序列检测保守起步 + 默认关闭(v2.0)—— IN-SEQ-* 仅触发 StatusBar 通知,不引入新 Block 路径;默认关闭(feature flag sequence_detection = false),用户主动 opt-in。升级为 Block 类需充分样本积累 + FP < 0.5% + 新决策记录。
  16. 所有入站能力必须经过 content-type 路由矩阵测试(v2.0)—— 任何新增入站功能必须有集成测试覆盖 4 类组合(Anthropic SSE / Anthropic JSON / OpenAI SSE / OpenAI stream=false JSON);新功能只挂 SSE 不挂 JSON 视为 P0 漏洞。

Read the full file on GitHub · 187 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 187 lines · 3,562 tokens per session scan A 6c27b9a43c18

Subscribe to this mod's changes

sieve AGENTS.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository SieveAI-dev/sieve (2 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 3,562 tokens to every session, about $0.0178 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

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