Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
/plugin marketplace add jonaslejon/linux-security-audit-pluginnpx agentmods add plugins/jonaslejon/linux-security-audit-plugin/marketplacegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jonaslejon/linux-security-audit-pluginGrade A, and why
jonaslejon scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
{
"$schema": "https://anthropic.com/claude-code/marketplace.schema.json",
"name": "jonaslejon",
"description": "Linux security auditing for Claude Code",
"owner": {
"name": "Jonas Lejon",
"url": "https://github.com/jonaslejon"
},
"plugins": [
{
"name": "linux-security-audit",
"description": "Audit a Linux host's security hardening posture and produce a risk-ranked report. 461 checks across 33 areas: kernel sysctls and boot parameters, mount options, SUID/SGID, SELinux/AppArmor confinement, local privilege-escalation paths, the boot and service-start trust chain, TLS ciphers and mutual-TLS enforcement, web server hardening, cleartext secrets, image and template hygiene, and static-vs-runtime drift. Runs against a live host, a mounted image, or a container.",
"version": "1.7.0",
"author": { "name": "Jonas Lejon", "url": "https://github.com/jonaslejon" },
"category": "security",
"source": "./plugins/linux-security-audit"
}
]
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 20 lines scan A 04f0dbc5faa8
jonaslejon is a plugin published in the GitHub repository jonaslejon/linux-security-audit-plugin (13 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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