Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
/plugin marketplace add karanb192/claude-code-hooksnpx agentmods add plugins/karanb192/claude-code-hooks/config-guardgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/karanb192/claude-code-hooksGrade A, and why
config-guard scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
{
"name": "config-guard",
"description": "Who guards the guards: a PreToolUse hook that blocks the agent from tampering with its own guardrail configuration. Deny-by-default protection for settings.json, hook scripts and hooks.json manifests, .mcp.json, plugin manifests, and (at strict level) CLAUDE.md and rules/agents/commands, across Bash, Edit, MultiEdit, and Write, including `claude config/mcp/plugin` CLI writes. Reads always pass; symlinked paths are resolved; creating a protected file counts as mutation (the CVE-2026-25725 vector). Escape hatch via CONFIG_GUARD_ALLOW=true, per-level ask mode via HOOK_ASK_*.",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": {
"name": "Karan Bansal",
"url": "https://github.com/karanb192"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/karanb192/claude-code-hooks",
"license": "MIT",
"keywords": [
"claude-code",
"hooks",
"security",
"guardrails",
"config",
"supply-chain",
"pretooluse"
]
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 21 lines scan A b669f77e3bec
config-guard is a plugin published in the GitHub repository karanb192/claude-code-hooks (494 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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