Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
/plugin marketplace add threatcl/claude-pluginnpx agentmods add plugins/threatcl/claude-plugin/marketplacegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/threatcl/claude-pluginGrade A, and why
threatcl scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
{
"name": "threatcl",
"description": "Threatcl's official Claude Code plugins — threat modeling with Threatcl Cloud, plus an opt-in language server for HCL threat models.",
"owner": {
"name": "Threatcl",
"url": "https://threatcl.com"
},
"plugins": [
{
"name": "threatcl-cloud",
"source": "./",
"description": "Threat modeling and security analysis with Threatcl Cloud. Includes a skill, five workflow slash commands, and the Threatcl Cloud MCP server.",
"homepage": "https://threatcl.com",
"keywords": ["threat-modeling", "security", "stride", "hcl"]
},
{
"name": "threatcl-lsp",
"source": "./threatcl-lsp",
"description": "Opt-in language server: live diagnostics for threatcl HCL threat models via the threatcl lsp server. Claims all *.hcl files; requires threatcl 0.5.0+ on PATH.",
"homepage": "https://threatcl.com",
"keywords": ["threat-modeling", "lsp", "hcl", "threatcl"]
}
]
}
What ships with it
1 file beside marketplace.json in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 25 lines scan A c3c3be502c03
threatcl is a plugin published in the GitHub repository threatcl/claude-plugin (4 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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