Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/doidor/agentrig/securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/doidor/agentrigWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00312 | $0.00312 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00156 | $0.00156 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00062 | $0.00062 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00031 | $0.00031 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Security rules (reflex)
Apply on every edit. When in doubt, stop and flag rather than guess.
- No secrets in source. Never commit tokens, keys, passwords, or connection strings. Read them from environment/secret stores. If you spot a committed secret, stop and report it.
- Validate and sanitize all external input (request bodies, query params, CLI args, file contents, env). Reject/normalize before use.
- No injection. Use parameterized queries; never string-concatenate SQL/shell/HTML from input.
Avoid
eval, dynamicrequire, and shelling out with unsanitized input. - Escape on output to prevent XSS; use the framework's escaping, not hand-rolled.
- Least privilege. Don't broaden file, network, or token scopes to make something work.
- Don't disable security controls (auth checks, CSRF, TLS verification, lint security rules) to pass a test or unblock a build.
- Dependencies: prefer maintained, pinned versions; don't add a dependency to avoid a few lines.
If a change touches auth, crypto, or input boundaries, call it out explicitly for review.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 25 lines · 312 tokens per session scan A d95dc944d76d
security is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository doidor/agentrig (5 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 312 tokens to every session, about $0.0016 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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