client-reverse

A request-analysis skill for reproducing client-generated signatures and anti-bot tokens. These are values added by a website or app to prove that a request came from its own client.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it in authorized bug bounty testing to replay protected requests and then check the underlying API for access-control or business-logic flaws.
Why use it?
It helps when a captured request fails outside the browser or app because a signature, token, or timestamp is missing or invalid.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/client-reverse
Any agent
npx skills add Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill client-reverse
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 203 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 4,675 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 2 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00203 $0.04675
Opus 5 $0.00102 $0.02337
Sonnet 5 $0.00041 $0.00935
Haiku 4.5 $0.00020 $0.00468

Measured yesterday against content hash 893a3f3c8bf3, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

client-reverse scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration

A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.

return requests.post("https://target.com/api/order",

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

| request body field | final `JSON.stringify` / submit / `fetch(body=...)` |
skills/client-reverse/SKILL.md · 293 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 293 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

CLIENT-SIDE REQUEST-SIGNING / ANTI-BOT TOKEN REVERSAL

You hit a request you cannot replay. Burp Repeater returns 401 invalid signature or 403 bot detected even though the browser/app does it fine. There is a sign, sig, X-Signature, _token, nonce, X-Acf-Sensor-Data, or encrypted body the client computes. This skill recovers just enough of that signer to reproduce the request outside the client.

Why a bug bounty hunter cares: the signature is not the bug. The signature is the lock on the door. Behind it is an API the program assumed only their own client would ever reach — so that API is often under-tested for IDOR, BOLA, mass assignment, and business logic. Reversing the signer is the cost of admission; the payout comes from what you fuzz once you're inside. Never report "I reversed your sign algorithm" as a finding on its own — that is N/A. Report the IDOR/auth bug you reached through it.


THE CORE PRINCIPLE: PACKET-FIRST

Reverse engineering is a blocker-resolution step, not the default entrypoint. Capture the real request first. Prove whether it already replays. Only reverse the signer if replay actually fails.

Most hunters waste hours decompiling JS for a "signature" that turns out to be replayable as-is, or gated by a timestamp that's valid for 5 minutes. Run this gate before opening DevTools Sources:

1. Capture the real request    (Burp/mitmproxy proxy, or DevTools → Network → Copy as cURL)
2. Replay it UNCHANGED          (paste cURL into terminal, or Burp Repeater)
   → 200 / works?  → IT'S NOT SIGNED. Skip all reversing. Go fuzz it.
3. Replay it again 5 min later  → still 200?  → no freshness check (replay window is wide/infinite)
4. Mutate ONE non-signed field  (e.g. change an `id` in the body, keep sign as-is)
   → 200?  → the sign does NOT cover that field → tamper freely, no reversing needed
   → 401?  → the sign covers it → NOW you reverse (continue to STAGES below)

Steps 2–4 alone kill ~half of "I need to reverse this" assumptions. A signature that omits the payload or endpoint, or never expires, is itself the bug — see the CoinMate pattern in Real Paid Examples.

Read the full file on GitHub · 293 lines

Files

What ships with it

1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 293 lines · 203 tokens per session scan B 893a3f3c8bf3

Subscribe to this mod's changes

client-reverse is a skill published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,651 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 203 tokens to every session and 4,675 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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