fusebase-flow: Skill for Claude Code

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• high Rogue Agent · line 375
  Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.
  Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
• high Rogue Agent · line 376
  Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.
  Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
• high Rogue Agent · line 380
  Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.
  Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
• high Privilege Escalation · line 387
  Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
  Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
• high Privilege Escalation · line 457
  Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
  Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
• high Tool Misuse · line 452
  Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
  Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
• high Excessive Agency · line 706
  Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.
  Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
• medium analysis-evasion · line 1
  Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
  Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
• medium MCP Rug Pull · line 26
  npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
  Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
• medium Rogue Agent · line 49
  Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
  Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
• medium Prompt Injection · line 302
  Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
  Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
• low Privilege Escalation · line 312
  Skill requests more permissions than appear necessary for its stated functionality. Review if elevated access is justified.
  Fix: Request only the minimum permissions required. Document why each permission is needed. Remove broad permissions like '*' or 'all'.