Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add griffinwork40/agent-framework --skill shadow-verifygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/griffinwork40/agent-frameworkWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/griffinwork40/agent-framework/shadow-verify)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/griffinwork40/agent-framework/shadow-verify"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/griffinwork40/agent-framework/shadow-verify/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/griffinwork40/agent-framework/shadow-verify"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/griffinwork40/agent-framework/shadow-verify.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00136 | $0.02743 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00054 | $0.01097 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00549 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00274 |
Grade A, and why
shadow-verify scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 19d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- **Default to `subagent_type: "research-agent"` (mechanically locked to Read/Grep/Glob/WebFetch/WebSearch — cannot Edit/commit/push).** If the claim requires Bash to verify (running a failing test, `gh pr view`, `git lo This is a copy
100% identical to shadow-verify — 63 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 97 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Sub-agent contract
/contract
When a sub-agent (or wave) returns investigation findings, code-review conclusions, audit claims, refactor plans, gap-analysis results, or counts that will drive user decisions or file changes, do NOT surface the report. Instead, run a shadow verification wave before merging.
Pre-flight: claim normalization and scale guard
Before dispatching verifiers, the coordinating agent normalizes each claim to a canonical form:
[CLAIM_ID] <subject> :: <predicate> :: <evidence_ref>
evidence_ref must be a concrete pointer — a file path, line number, git ref, config key, or API endpoint. Claims that cannot be anchored to a concrete evidence_ref are classified UNVERIFIABLE immediately and removed from the verification queue. They are preserved in the final output under a dedicated section with the reason they could not be anchored (no re-derivation sub-agent is dispatched for them).
Scale cap: if the normalized claim list exceeds 50 items, the coordinating agent halts and asks the operator to scope the investigation before proceeding. Verification at scale degrades into noise; a 50-item cap prevents a finding flood from becoming an echo-chamber rubber-stamp.
Select 2–3 of the highest-stakes normalized claims to send to the verifier wave. Prefer claims that are (a) decision-driving, (b) expressed with high-confidence language, or (c) hard to re-derive from a single artifact.
Wave 2 — Adversarial verifiers (parallel, independent):
- Extract 2–3 concrete, re-checkable claims from the returned report (e.g., "X function is unused", "file Y exceeds 300 lines", "PR targets main", "no tests cover Z") and normalize them to
[CLAIM_ID] subject :: predicate :: evidence_refform as described above. - Dispatch one shadow sub-agent per claim, in parallel. Each receives the normalized claim text + the user's original goal + the search surface — the inventory of files, directories, or URLs the original investigation touched. It must NOT receive the original agent's reasoning, verdict, confidence language, or the specific line/region it concluded from. Withhold the conclusion, not the map. Withholding the map too does not buy extra independence — the verifier still has to reach the same evidence, it just spends its budget guessing paths to get there. Measured: one verifier denied the inventory spent 70
grep+ 18read_filecalls re-locating files the parent already had paths for, guessed 5 nonexistent paths on the way, and hit its tool-loop ceiling before finishing. The independence that matters is epistemic (re-deriving the verdict), not navigational.- The inventory is a starting surface, not a boundary: it does not satisfy the composition-axis guard below, and a verifier that reads only inside it still returns
evidence_base: artifact-internal. At least one primary source outside that surface is still required forindependent-rederivation. - Default to
subagent_type: "research-agent"(mechanically locked to Read/Grep/Glob/WebFetch/WebSearch — cannot Edit/commit/push). If the claim requires Bash to verify (running a failing test,gh pr view,git log origin/...), fall back to a Bash-capable subagent type withisolation: "worktree"and prepend this prefix to the prompt: "Verifier sub-agent — do not Edit, Write, commit, push,gh pr create, orcurl. Return findings only." - Set
id_prefixto a short label identifying the claim being verified, e.g."verify: unused export"or"verify: missing null check", so the live TUI shows which claim each verifier is checking. - Every verifier dispatch carries an explicit budget —
max_tool_use_iterations(a wave of 2–3 claim checks needs ~15–25 rounds each, not 50) plus the cheapest sufficient model. An unbudgeted verifier does not fail loudly: it exhausts the default tool-round ceiling, terminatesstopReason: "tool_use_loop_capped", and emits its verdict from a tools-stripped wind-down round built on partial evidence. ACONFIRMEDproduced that way is indistinguishable from a real one and silently defeats the entire point of the wave. Check each returned verifier's stop reason before merging its verdict; treat a capped or wind-down verifier asUNVERIFIABLE, not as a verdict.
- The inventory is a starting surface, not a boundary: it does not satisfy the composition-axis guard below, and a verifier that reads only inside it still returns
- Each verifier re-derives the verdict independently using tool calls only — never re-reading the original report's reasoning. Returns
{claim_id, verifier_verdict, evidence_pointer, evidence_base}, whereverifier_verdictis one ofCONFIRMED,REFUTED,STALE, orUNVERIFIABLE, andevidence_baseisindependent-rederivation(read primary sources outside the cited artifact's boundary) orartifact-internal(re-read only the cited file/region). OnREFUTEDorSTALE, the verifier also emits a corrected or updated finding.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 19d ago Changed · +1 lines d38252df942b
- 1mo ago First seen · 96 lines · 136 tokens per session scan A 9f7db5a0612c
shadow-verify is a skill published in the GitHub repository griffinwork40/agent-framework (23 stars, last pushed 16d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 136 tokens to every session and 2,743 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 100% identical to shadow-verify, differing in 63 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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