Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to probelabs/visor. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/probelabs/visor/main/.claude/skills/visor-agent-dev/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/probelabs/visorWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/probelabs/visor/visor-agent-dev)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/probelabs/visor/visor-agent-dev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/probelabs/visor/visor-agent-dev/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/probelabs/visor/visor-agent-dev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/probelabs/visor/visor-agent-dev.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 54 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 479 This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 24 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 27 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 113 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 126 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 131 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 133 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 140 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 147 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 148 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 149 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 154 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 159 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 164 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 165 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 166 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 167 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 168 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 169 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 174 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.04572 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.01829 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00914 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00457 |
Grade A, and why
visor-agent-dev scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 499 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Visor Agent Development Skill
You are helping the user build or extend a visor-based AI assistant. Follow this structured workflow to ensure correctness, safety, and iterability.
SAFETY RULES — READ FIRST
- NEVER run with real providers (
--no-mocks) without user confirmation. Real runs consume API credits and may trigger external side effects. - NEVER modify or delete existing production configs (e.g., the main
.visor.yamlortyk-assistant.yaml) without explicit user approval. Work on copies or new files. - NEVER commit API keys, tokens, or secrets into YAML files. Use
${ENV_VAR}references. - NEVER add
allowed_commandspatterns likerm:*,sudo:*,chmod:*, or other destructive shell patterns to skills. - NEVER run
visorwith--slack,--telegram,--a2a, or other runner flags unless the user explicitly asks — these connect to live services. - Ask before running any command that hits external APIs (MCP servers, HTTP clients, etc.).
- When writing
disallowed_commandsfor skills, always include:rm:*,sudo:*,shutdown:*,reboot:*,mkfs:*,dd:*.
RUNNING VISOR
All commands in this skill use npx -y @probelabs/visor@latest (aliased as visor below for brevity). When executing commands, always use the full npx form so it works out of the box without a global install:
npx -y @probelabs/visor@latest <command> [flags]
If the user has visor installed globally or as a project dependency, they may tell you to use visor directly — follow their preference.
DEVELOPMENT WORKFLOW
Follow these steps in order. The goal is: write tests first → validate config → iterate with mocks → graduate to real providers → debug with traces.
Step 1: Understand the Goal
Ask the user what they want to build:
- A new skill (knowledge + tools bundle for the assistant)?
- A new workflow (reusable multi-step pipeline)?
- A new check (standalone analysis step)?
- A modification to an existing assistant?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 499 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A f50c6fcc0185
visor-agent-dev is a skill published in the GitHub repository probelabs/visor (25 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 4,572 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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