Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to stacklok/toolhive-studio. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/stacklok/toolhive-studio/main/.claude/skills/devcontainer-dev/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/stacklok/toolhive-studioWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/stacklok/toolhive-studio/devcontainer-dev)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/stacklok/toolhive-studio/devcontainer-dev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/stacklok/toolhive-studio/devcontainer-dev/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/stacklok/toolhive-studio/devcontainer-dev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/stacklok/toolhive-studio/devcontainer-dev.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 44 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 135 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 214 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 244 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 30 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Rogue Agent · line 81 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 208 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 214 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 258 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.03647 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.01459 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00729 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00365 |
Grade B, and why
devcontainer-dev scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo modprobe iptable_nat iptable_filter ip_tables How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 277 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Containerized Dev Environment
An isolated, cross-platform test environment for ToolHive Studio. The whole Electron app — including its backend thv binary and the MCP-server containers it spawns — runs inside a single devcontainer. You interact with the UI via a noVNC browser tab.
The entire stack (Node, Electron, display server, window manager, VNC server, Docker-in-Docker, DBus, keyring) lives in the container. Nothing is installed on the host. That's the whole point: every worktree can have its own container and its own experiments, with zero risk of contaminating the user's global installs.
Entry point
pnpm devContainer:dev
runs scripts/devcontainer-dev.sh on the host. The script is "smart":
- If executed on the host: runs
devcontainer upto build/start the container, thendevcontainer execto run the entrypoint inside it. - If executed inside a container (detected via
/.dockerenv): skips the build step and just runs the entrypoint directly. This path is used by GitHub Codespaces.
The three scripts
| Script | Runs on | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
scripts/devcontainer-dev.sh |
host | Picks a host port, kills stale processes, starts readiness poller, opens browser when ready, devcontainer execs the entrypoint. |
scripts/devcontainer-entrypoint.sh |
in container | Cleans stale X/VNC state, starts Xvfb, fluxbox, x11vnc, websockify/noVNC, dbus, gnome-keyring, then runs pnpm start. |
scripts/devcontainer-post-start.sh |
in container | postStartCommand in devcontainer.json. In Codespaces (detected via $CODESPACES) it nohup-launches the entrypoint in the background so the noVNC preview pane opens without user action. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 277 lines · 0 tokens per session scan B 9e710a0f8730
devcontainer-dev is a skill published in the GitHub repository stacklok/toolhive-studio (173 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 3,647 tokens. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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