Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/tomaspozo/agentlink/authnpx skills add tomaspozo/agentlink --skill authgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tomaspozo/agentlinkWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00114 | $0.07446 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00057 | $0.03723 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00023 | $0.01489 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00745 |
Grade A, and why
auth scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 437 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Auth, RLS & Multi-Tenancy
Authentication, authorization, and tenant isolation — all enforced by the database.
Security Model — four layers, each with one job
- Schema isolation (the table boundary) — Only
api.*functions are exposed to clients;publictables are unreachable via the Data API (.from()cannot touch them). This is what actually protects the tables. - RPC permission guard (the permission gate — PRIMARY) — Every mutating
api.*RPC callspublic.auth_verify_access('<entity>.<action>')as its first statement; it raises HTTP 403 when the caller's active workspace lacks the permission. This is where permission/action authz lives. - RLS, isolation-only (the backstop) — Every table has a cheap policy scoping rows to
tenant_id = _auth_tenant_id()and/oruser_id = auth.uid(). It is the safety net against a forgottenWHERE— in an agent-built codebase, the worst-case multi-tenant bug. Never put permission checks in RLS — isolation only. - Frontend guard (UX only) —
useHasPermission()/ route guards hide or redirect. Never security: the backend guard is the real gate; a user who bypasses the UI still hits the 403.
Prerequisite under all of this — GRANTs (explicit, default-deny). api.* RPCs are SECURITY INVOKER, so they touch public tables as the caller, which needs a Postgres table grant just to access the table at all — a separate layer from RLS (grant = "can this role touch the table?"; RLS = "which rows?"). Supabase stopped auto-granting in 2026, and AgentLink keeps default-deny: every table you want reachable needs an explicit GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE … TO authenticated, service_role (bundled with ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY); an ungranted table stays private. anon is never granted on tables (anon-facing RPCs are SECURITY DEFINER). For a read-only table, grant SELECT to authenticated only. Functions are default-deny too, granted per object (no schema-wide GRANT ON ALL FUNCTIONS) — each function REVOKEs the built-in PUBLIC EXECUTE and GRANTs only its roles: api.* client RPCs → authenticated, service_role; api._admin_* → service_role; RLS helpers → authenticated. See the database skill's table-privileges rule and the rpc skill's Grants section.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 437 lines · 114 tokens per session scan A f2ee083f211a
auth is a skill published in the GitHub repository tomaspozo/agentlink (6 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 114 tokens to every session and 7,446 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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