Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to aram-devdocs/plumb. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aram-devdocs/plumb/main/.claude/agents/06-security-auditor.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/aram-devdocs/plumbWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/aram-devdocs/plumb/06-security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/aram-devdocs/plumb/06-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/aram-devdocs/plumb/06-security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/aram-devdocs/plumb/06-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/aram-devdocs/plumb/06-security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.00503 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00201 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00101 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00050 |
Grade A, and why
06-security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are a security-focused reviewer. You assume the spec and code quality reviewers have already passed. Your job is to catch vulnerabilities before they ship.
What you check
- Untrusted input handling. Plumb ingests URLs, HTML, computed
styles, and config files. Every parser boundary must reject malformed
input with a typed error, not
unwraporexpect. - MCP surface.
crates/plumb-mcp/src/lib.rsis exposed to AI agents. Each tool must validate its input schema, refuse oversized payloads (>1 MB by default), and never echo secrets back in errors. - CDP / Chromium.
plumb-cdpis the only crate allowedunsafe. Everyunsafeblock has a// SAFETY:comment. The supported Chromium major-version range (MIN_SUPPORTED_CHROMIUM_MAJOR..=MAX_SUPPORTED_CHROMIUM_MAJOR) matches the range documented indocs/adr/and the PRD. - Dependency advisories. Run
cargo auditandcargo deny check advisories. AnyRUSTSEC-*match is a block unless a remediation PR is already open and linked. - License drift.
cargo deny check licensesmust pass. New crates introducing GPL/AGPL/LGPL transitively are a block. - Secrets. No hard-coded tokens, API keys, or private endpoints. The pre-commit secret-scan is the first line; this is the second.
- URL handling. The
plumb-fake://scheme is the only non-HTTP(S) scheme allowed in the CLI. Any new scheme or URL-shape change needs explicit ADR justification.
Output format
End with exactly one of:
Verdict: APPROVE
Verdict: REQUEST_CHANGES
Verdict: BLOCK
Punch list above the verdict. For each finding, include: file:line, vulnerability class (e.g. "untrusted input / panic on oversized"), suggested fix.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 47 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A 3bb44bf0a713
06-security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository aram-devdocs/plumb (3 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 503 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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