wordpress-attacker

A static-analysis security agent for finding WordPress-specific weaknesses in source code without running the site.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to check for SQL injection, cross-site scripting, file inclusion, privilege escalation, weak configuration, unsafe REST permissions, XML-RPC issues, user enumeration, and unsafe object deserialization.
Why use it?
It helps uncover common WordPress security mistakes before they can expose data, allow unauthorised actions, or execute unsafe input.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/morodomi/dev-crew/wordpress-attacker
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/morodomi/dev-crew
Per session 36 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,557 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00036 $0.01557
Opus 5 $0.00018 $0.00779
Sonnet 5 $0.00007 $0.00311
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00156

Measured yesterday against content hash 05fea4555ba0, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

wordpress-attacker scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

agents/wordpress-attacker.md · 135 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Detection Targets

Category Type Description
wp-sqli SQL Injection $wpdb without prepare
wp-xss Cross-site Scripting echo $_GET/$_POST without escaping
wp-lfi Local File Inclusion include/require with user input
wp-privilege Privilege Escalation Missing current_user_can check
wp-config Misconfiguration WP_DEBUG enabled, weak keys
wp-rest-api Broken Access Control Missing permission_callback
wp-xmlrpc Misconfiguration XML-RPC without restriction
wp-user-enum Information Exposure User enumeration via REST/feed
wp-deserialize Object Injection Unsafe unserialize with user input

Framework Detection Patterns

Context Vulnerable Pattern Safe Pattern
Database $wpdb->query("...$var") $wpdb->prepare("...%s", $var)
Output echo $_GET['x'] echo esc_html($_GET['x'])
File include($_GET['f']) include(plugin_dir_path(__FILE__) . 'file.php')
AJAX add_action('wp_ajax_x', 'fn') without check if (!current_user_can('edit_posts')) wp_die()
REST API 'permission_callback' => '__return_true' 'permission_callback' => function() { return current_user_can('edit_posts'); }

Dangerous Patterns

patterns:
  # SQL Injection ($wpdb) - direct query with variable interpolation
  - '\$wpdb->query\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
  - '\$wpdb->get_results\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
  - '\$wpdb->get_row\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
  - '\$wpdb->get_var\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
  - '\$wpdb->(insert|update|delete)\s*\([^)]*\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)'
  - '\$wpdb->query\s*\([^)]*\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)'

  # XSS - direct echo/print of user input
  - '(echo|print)\s+\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)\s*\['
  - 'printf\s*\([^)]*\$_(GET|POST)'

  # LFI - include/require with user input
  - '(include|include_once|require|require_once)\s*\(\s*\$_(GET|POST)'

  # Privilege Escalation - AJAX/admin handlers without capability check
  - 'add_action\s*\(\s*["\']wp_ajax_(nopriv_)?'
  - 'admin_post_'

  # REST API - insecure permission callbacks
  - 'permission_callback.*__return_true'
  - "permission_callback.*=>\\s*['\"]?true"
  - 'register_rest_route\s*\('  # context check for permission_callback presence

  # wp-config.php Misconfiguration
  - "define\\s*\\(\\s*['\"]WP_DEBUG(_LOG|_DISPLAY)?['\"]\\s*,\\s*true\\s*\\)"
  - "define\\s*\\(\\s*['\"]DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT['\"]\\s*,\\s*false\\s*\\)"
  - "\\$table_prefix\\s*=\\s*['\"]wp_['\"]"

  # XML-RPC
  - 'xmlrpc_enabled.*true'
  - 'add_filter.*xmlrpc_enabled.*__return_true'
  - 'xmlrpc\.php'

  # User Enumeration
  - 'register_rest_route.*users'
  - '/wp-json/wp/v2/users'
  - 'author_rewrite_rules'
  - '\?author='
  - 'wp_login_failed.*\$_'

  # Object Injection (Deserialization)
  - '(maybe_)?unserialize\s*\(\s*\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)'
  - 'unserialize\s*\(\s*base64_decode'

Read the full file on GitHub · 135 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 135 lines · 36 tokens per session scan A 05fea4555ba0

Subscribe to this mod's changes

wordpress-attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository morodomi/dev-crew (1 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 1,557 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.