Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/triagegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00993 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00496 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00199 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00099 |
Grade A, and why
triage scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 118 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/triage
Quick triage to decide: submit or kill?
When to Use
Use this before spending time writing a full report. If triage passes, run /validate for the full 4-gate check, then /report.
Usage
/triage
Describe the finding in one sentence. Example:
- "I can read other users' orders by changing user_id in /api/orders/{id}"
- "The /api/export endpoint returns 200 with data even with no auth header"
- "I found X-Forwarded-Host is reflected in the password reset email"
The 7 Questions (Fast Version)
Answer YES or NO to each. First NO = kill it immediately.
Q1: Can I demonstrate this with a real HTTP request RIGHT NOW?
YES: I have the request/response already
NO: I need to look at more code first → KILL
Q2: Is this impact type accepted by the program?
YES: Bug class is on their accepted list
NO: They explicitly exclude this type → KILL
Q3: Is the vulnerable asset owned by and in scope for the program?
YES: Domain confirmed in-scope, not third-party
NO: Third-party service or excluded domain → KILL
Q4: Does this work without admin/privileged access?
YES: Regular user account is enough
NO: Requires admin → KILL (99% of programs)
Q5: Is this NOT already known/disclosed/documented behavior?
YES: Not in changelogs, not in disclosed reports
NO: It's documented as intended → KILL
Q6: Can I prove impact beyond "technically possible"?
YES: I have actual data in the response / action completed
NO: I only have a 200 status or error message → DOWNGRADE
Q7: Is this NOT on the never-submit list?
YES: It's a real bug class
NO: Missing headers, self-XSS, open redirect alone, etc. → KILL or CHAIN
Auth-related findings need identity proof
If the bug class involves IDOR, BOLA, auth bypass, ATO, or privilege escalation, you must prove it across identities:
- Session A reading Session B's data
- Fresh session repro
- Anonymous vs authenticated delta
Blank answers fail this check. If you cannot prove cross-account impact, kill it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 118 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A a44c9652de41
triage is a command published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,651 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 993 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
recon
Run full recon pipeline on a target — subdomain enum (Chaos API + subfinder), live host discovery (dnsx + httpx), URL crawl (katana + waybackurls + gau), gf pattern classification, nuclei scan. Outputs to recon/ / directory. Usage: /recon target.com.
hunt
Active vulnerability hunting. Two-track dispatcher — asks Red Team vs WAPT, hands off to hunt-dispatch skill and sibling commands. Usage: /hunt target.com | /hunt .target.com | /hunt targets.txt [--vuln-class X] [--source-code P] [--chrome].
token-scan
Meme coin and token security scan — checks for rug pull vectors (hidden mint, honeypot, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass, authority retention, bonding curve exploits, fake renounce, sandwich amplification). Manual 8-class grep audit (with an optional automated scanner if present). Usage: /token-scan [--chain solana].
autopilot
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo].
triage
Quick 7-Question Gate triage on a finding before writing a report. Kills N/A submissions before they happen. Faster than /validate — for quick go/no-go decisions. Usage: /triage.
validate
Validate a finding — runs 7-Question Gate + 4-gate checklist. Kills weak findings before report writing. Prevents N/A submissions that hurt validity ratio. Usage: /validate.