Claude Code Spec Workflow is a set of Claude Code commands and agents that organizes software work into documented stages for new features and bug fixes. It is for developers who want Claude Code to handle requirements, design, implementation, issue resolution, and verification through repeatable workflows, with the catalogue entries providing the associated commands and agents.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/triage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/triage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/triage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/triage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/triage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.00837 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00335 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00167 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00084 |
Grade A, and why
triage scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 97 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/triage
Quick triage to decide: submit or kill?
When to Use
Use this before spending time writing a full report. If triage passes, run /validate for the full 4-gate check, then /report.
Usage
/triage
Describe the finding in one sentence. Example:
- "I can read other users' orders by changing user_id in /api/orders/{id}"
- "The /api/export endpoint returns 200 with data even with no auth header"
- "I found X-Forwarded-Host is reflected in the password reset email"
The 7 Questions (Fast Version)
Answer YES or NO to each. First NO = kill it immediately.
Q1: Can I demonstrate this with a real HTTP request RIGHT NOW?
YES: I have the request/response already
NO: I need to look at more code first → KILL
Q2: Is this impact type accepted by the program?
YES: Bug class is on their accepted list
NO: They explicitly exclude this type → KILL
Q3: Is the vulnerable asset owned by and in scope for the program?
YES: Domain confirmed in-scope, not third-party
NO: Third-party service or excluded domain → KILL
Q4: Does this work without admin/privileged access?
YES: Regular user account is enough
NO: Requires admin → KILL (99% of programs)
Q5: Is this NOT already known/disclosed/documented behavior?
YES: Not in changelogs, not in disclosed reports
NO: It's documented as intended → KILL
Q6: Can I prove impact beyond "technically possible"?
YES: I have actual data in the response / action completed
NO: I only have a 200 status or error message → DOWNGRADE
Q7: Is this NOT on the never-submit list?
YES: It's a real bug class
NO: Missing headers, self-XSS, open redirect alone, etc. → KILL or CHAIN
Fast Kill Checklist
Kill immediately if ANY of these are true:
[ ] "Admin can do X" = not a bug
[ ] "Could theoretically lead to..." = no PoC = not a bug
[ ] Bug requires 3+ preconditions simultaneously
[ ] Finding is a missing header, missing flag, missing DMARC
[ ] SSRF with DNS callback only, no data returned
[ ] Open redirect with no OAuth chain or ATO path
[ ] Self-XSS (only affects your own account)
[ ] Introspection only (no IDOR, no auth bypass shown)
[ ] Rate limit on login/contact/search (Cloudflare covers it)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 97 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A c319f357f434
triage is a command published in the GitHub repository elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (4,874 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 837 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
web3-audit
Smart contract security audit — runs through 10 bug class checklist (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle errors, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy/upgrade). Applies pre-dive kill signals first. Generates Foundry PoC template for confirmed findings. Usage…
bypass-403
Probe a 403/401 endpoint with the most-paid bypass tricks (header injection, path encoding, method swap, WAF fingerprint, vendor-specific). Wraps byp4xx when installed; otherwise runs a built-in matrix of 38+ techniques. Usage: /bypass-403 | /bypass-403 -l.
spray
Password spray with hard guards — typed-hostname confirmation, lockout warning, audit log. Modes: http-form (custom login page), oauth (password grant), o365 + okta (via TREVORspray). Default delay 30min/round + 60s jitter. Usage /spray --mode --users --passes.
autopilot
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo].
breach-check
HIBP k-anonymity check on a password wordlist. Enriches each password with its breach count, ranks DESC. Free API (no key), only first 5 chars of SHA-1 sent. Output -> -ranked.txt. Usage /breach-check [--min-count N] [--max-count N] [--with-counts].
recon
Run the full recon pipeline by invoking tools/reconengine.sh — subdomain enum (subfinder + amass + crt.sh + wayback), httpx live host probing with tech detection, nmap port scan, gau URL collection, JS analysis, ffuf directory fuzzing, parameter discovery, config exposure check, CI/CD workflow scan. Outputs to recon/…