Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-aiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/triage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/triage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/triage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/triage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/triage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00042 | $0.00832 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00416 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00166 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00083 |
Grade A, and why
triage scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
97% identical to triage — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 96 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/triage
Quick triage to decide: submit or kill?
When to Use
Use this before spending time writing a full report. If triage passes, run /validate for the full 4-gate check, then /report.
Usage
/triage
Describe the finding in one sentence. Example:
- "I can read other users' orders by changing user_id in /api/orders/{id}"
- "The /api/export endpoint returns 200 with data even with no auth header"
- "I found X-Forwarded-Host is reflected in the password reset email"
The 7 Questions (Fast Version)
Answer YES or NO to each. First NO = kill it immediately.
Q1: Can I demonstrate this with a real HTTP request RIGHT NOW?
YES: I have the request/response already
NO: I need to look at more code first → KILL
Q2: Is this impact type accepted by the program?
YES: Bug class is on their accepted list
NO: They explicitly exclude this type → KILL
Q3: Is the vulnerable asset owned by and in scope for the program?
YES: Domain confirmed in-scope, not third-party
NO: Third-party service or excluded domain → KILL
Q4: Does this work without admin/privileged access?
YES: Regular user account is enough
NO: Requires admin → KILL (99% of programs)
Q5: Is this NOT already known/disclosed/documented behavior?
YES: Not in changelogs, not in disclosed reports
NO: It's documented as intended → KILL
Q6: Can I prove impact beyond "technically possible"?
YES: I have actual data in the response / action completed
NO: I only have a 200 status or error message → DOWNGRADE
Q7: Is this NOT on the never-submit list?
YES: It's a real bug class
NO: Missing headers, self-XSS, open redirect alone, etc. → KILL or CHAIN
Fast Kill Checklist
Kill immediately if ANY of these are true:
[ ] "Admin can do X" = not a bug
[ ] "Could theoretically lead to..." = no PoC = not a bug
[ ] Bug requires 3+ preconditions simultaneously
[ ] Finding is a missing header, missing flag, missing DMARC
[ ] SSRF with DNS callback only, no data returned
[ ] Open redirect with no OAuth chain or ATO path
[ ] Self-XSS (only affects your own account)
[ ] Introspection only (no IDOR, no auth bypass shown)
[ ] Rate limit on login/contact/search (Cloudflare covers it)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 96 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A a6da6aa82230
triage is a command published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (57 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 832 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 97% identical to triage, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.
Other commands, from other repositories
design-onboarding
Design a first-run experience end to end — activation path, progressive disclosure, and time to first value.
assistant-auto
Orchestrator in automatic mode. Choose the workflow that semantically fits based on the request + the injected repo context, then execute immediately via Skill.
growth-email
Create transactional and marketing email templates.
amby.clarify
Resolve the open [NEEDS CLARIFICATION] markers in a feature spec.
aw-upgrade
Upgrade gh-aw extension, recompile and validate all workflows, and open a PR with changes.
review
Conduct a five-axis code review — correctness, readability, architecture, security, performance.