Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/validategit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01187 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00593 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00237 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00119 |
Grade A, and why
validate scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 160 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/validate
Run full validation on the current finding before writing a report.
What This Does
- Runs 7-Question Gate (one wrong answer = kill it)
- Checks against the always-rejected list
- Runs 4 pre-submission gates
- Outputs: PASS (write the report) or KILL (move on)
Usage
/validate
Describe the finding when prompted. Include:
- The endpoint
- The bug class
- What the PoC shows
- The target program
If you already ran the scanner, pass its summary.json with
--scanner-summary findings/<target>/summary.json so the validation record
captures the scanner tiering that led to this finding.
The 7-Question Gate
Answer each. ONE wrong answer = STOP.
Q1: Can I demonstrate this step-by-step RIGHT NOW?
Write this out:
1. Setup: I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body]
3. Result: Response shows [exact data / action completed]
4. Impact: Real consequence is [account takeover / PII exposed / money stolen]
5. Cost: Time: [X min], Capital: [$0 / $X]
If step 2 is "I need to look at the code more" → KILL IT.
Q2: Is the impact accepted by this program?
Check program scope page. Is your bug class listed? Is it excluded?
Q3: Is the vulnerable asset in scope?
Exact domain in scope? Not staging/dev? Not a third-party service?
Q4: Does it need admin or privileged access that an attacker can't get?
"Admin can do X" → KILL IT. "Regular user can do X that only admin should" → valid.
Q5: Is this known or documented behavior?
Search disclosed reports + changelog + API docs.
Q6: Can you prove impact beyond "technically possible"?
- XSS → actual cookie value in exfil request, not just alert()
- SSRF → response body from internal service, not just DNS callback
- IDOR → actual other-user's private data in response, not just 200 status
Q7: Is this on the never-submit list?
Missing headers, GraphQL introspection alone, clickjacking without PoC,
self-XSS, open redirect alone, SSRF DNS-only, logout CSRF, banner disclosure,
rate limit on non-critical forms, missing cookie flags alone...
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 160 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 05619757a222
validate is a command published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,651 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,187 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
recon
Run full recon pipeline on a target — subdomain enum (Chaos API + subfinder), live host discovery (dnsx + httpx), URL crawl (katana + waybackurls + gau), gf pattern classification, nuclei scan. Outputs to recon/ / directory. Usage: /recon target.com.
hunt
Active vulnerability hunting. Two-track dispatcher — asks Red Team vs WAPT, hands off to hunt-dispatch skill and sibling commands. Usage: /hunt target.com | /hunt .target.com | /hunt targets.txt [--vuln-class X] [--source-code P] [--chrome].
token-scan
Meme coin and token security scan — checks for rug pull vectors (hidden mint, honeypot, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass, authority retention, bonding curve exploits, fake renounce, sandwich amplification). Manual 8-class grep audit (with an optional automated scanner if present). Usage: /token-scan [--chain solana].
autopilot
Run autonomous hunt loop on a target — scope check → recon → rank surface → hunt → validate → report with configurable checkpoints. Usage: /autopilot target.com [--paranoid|--normal|--yolo].
validate
Validate a finding — runs 7-Question Gate + 4-gate checklist. Kills weak findings before report writing. Prevents N/A submissions that hurt validity ratio. Usage: /validate.
triage
Quick 7-Question Gate triage on a finding before writing a report. Kills N/A submissions before they happen. Faster than /validate — for quick go/no-go decisions. Usage: /triage.