exploit-live

A command that tests whether a smart-contract vulnerability works against a contract deployed on a real blockchain state. It creates a local copy, called a fork, of the chain and runs the attack test there.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to verify audit findings against deployed contracts, including the relevant chain, block, contract, and proof-of-concept test.
Why use it?
It removes the uncertainty of testing only a simplified local contract when the finding concerns an actual deployment. The result shows whether the attack works against the selected live state.

Command

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/exploit-live
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProof
Per session 23 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 646 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00023 $0.00646
Opus 5 $0.00012 $0.00323
Sonnet 5 $0.00005 $0.00129
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00065

Measured 2d ago against content hash f8738cd72a98, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

exploit-live scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

commands/exploit-live.md · 88 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 88 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

/exploit-live — exploit a deployed contract on a fork

For when the user has a finding from /audit-live and wants to verify it works on the real deployment.

Procedure

Step 1 — Fork the chain

mcp__anvil__fork(chain=<chain>, block=latest)

Capture the RPC URL.

Step 2 — Pull source if needed

If we don't already have the source from /audit-live, pull it via block-explorer.

Step 3 — Write the PoC against the fork

Same template as /exploit but using vm.createFork and vm.activeFork to target the live deployment:

function setUp() public {
    forkId = vm.createFork(ANVIL_FORK_URL);
    vm.selectFork(forkId);
    target = Vault(payable(LIVE_ADDRESS));
}

function test_Exploit_Live() public {
    // attempt against the *actual deployed state*
}

Step 4 — Run

Use forge-runner MCP with --fork-url pointed at the anvil instance.

Step 5 — Output

If the test passes:

✗ EXPLOITABLE on live deployment

  Chain:     berachain
  Block:     12345678
  Contract:  0xabc...
  Finding:   REENT-001
  Value extractable: ~$420K (at current price)

  PoC: test/live-exploits/ExploitLive-REENT-001.t.sol

If the test fails (i.e. the exploit doesn't work in practice):

✓ Finding REENT-001 does NOT exploit the live deployment as written.
  Possible reasons: live state differs from setUp assumption, finding requires
  preconditions not met by current state, or finding is a false positive.

This is a valuable output — false positives caught.

Responsible disclosure

If the exploit works against a contract not owned by the user, the output should include a prominent disclosure reminder:

⚠ RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE
This exploit works against a live deployment that you may not own.
DO NOT execute on mainnet. Coordinate disclosure via:
  - Immunefi:           https://immunefi.com
  - Protocol's bounty:  (check the protocol's docs)
  - SEAL 911:           https://seal-911.com  (emergency)

Notes

  • Always fork at a recent block to reflect current state.
  • Don't share the PoC publicly until the protocol has patched. Use /bounty to generate a disclosure-ready report and /bounty-submit to package it for Immunefi.

Read the full file on GitHub · 88 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 88 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A f8738cd72a98

Subscribe to this mod's changes

exploit-live is a command published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (9 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 646 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.