Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/archive228/loopkit/hitl-escalatenpx skills add Archive228/loopkit --skill hitl-escalategit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Archive228/loopkitWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00059 | $0.01176 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00588 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00235 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00118 |
Grade A, and why
hitl-escalate scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 85 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Human-in-the-Loop Escalate
Long-running agent loops fail in a specific way when they meet a question they can't answer: they guess. The guess ships, the next session builds on it, and by the time a human looks the divergence is three commits deep. This skill is the release valve — when the agent is stuck, it stops and asks, cleanly, in a shape the human can act on.
Trigger — escalate when any of these are true
- Ambiguous spec.
PROMPT.mdadmits two implementations and the choice changes user-visible behavior. - Missing credential. A required env var, API key, or config file is absent, and there is no sanctioned way for the agent to create one.
- Destructive action needing approval. Dropping a table, force-pushing, deleting user data, spending money, sending mail to real recipients.
- 3+ consecutive
/verifyfailures on the same task. The loop is thrashing. Stop and get a human eye before the fourth attempt. - External dependency down. A third-party service the feature needs is unreachable and no offline path exists.
If none of the above hold, do not escalate. Guessing is bad; escalating on a solvable problem is also bad (it trains humans to ignore the channel).
Primary action — call the human via the configured channel
Read LOOPKIT_HITL_CHANNEL. Supported values:
| Value | Shape |
|---|---|
telegram |
POST to https://api.telegram.org/bot$LOOPKIT_HITL_TELEGRAM_TOKEN/sendMessage with chat_id=$LOOPKIT_HITL_TELEGRAM_CHAT, text=<question + repo + short context>. |
slack |
POST JSON {"text": "..."} to $LOOPKIT_HITL_SLACK_WEBHOOK (incoming-webhook URL). |
dial |
Run $LOOPKIT_HITL_DIAL_CMD with the message on stdin. Whatever the operator wired up — SMS gateway, ntfy, phone call, pager. |
none (or unset) |
Skip the primary action. Go straight to fallback. |
Message body — always these five lines, in this order:
[loopkit] blocked in <repo-name> on <ISO timestamp>
Q: <one-line question>
Context: <one-line what you were doing>
Attempted: <one-line what you tried>
Choices: <A | B | C>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 85 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A 6463edf5c23f
hitl-escalate is a skill published in the GitHub repository Archive228/loopkit (753 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 1,176 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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