Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to auerbachb/claude-code-config. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/auerbachb/claude-code-config/main/.claude/skills/issue-maker/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/auerbachb/claude-code-configWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/issue-maker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/issue-maker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/issue-maker/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/issue-maker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/auerbachb/claude-code-config/issue-maker.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 81 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Data Exfiltration · line 101 Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.Fix: Remove any code that sends prompts, responses, or session data externally. Preserve user privacy; never exfiltrate conversation content.
- high Data Exfiltration · line 169 Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.Fix: Remove any code that sends prompts, responses, or session data externally. Preserve user privacy; never exfiltrate conversation content.
- high Data Exfiltration · line 570 Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.Fix: Remove any code that sends prompts, responses, or session data externally. Preserve user privacy; never exfiltrate conversation content.
- high Data Exfiltration · line 584 Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.Fix: Remove any code that sends prompts, responses, or session data externally. Preserve user privacy; never exfiltrate conversation content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 179 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 592 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 3 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 593 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 736 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 748 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00225 | $0.24225 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00090 | $0.09690 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00045 | $0.04845 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00022 | $0.02423 |
Grade A, and why
issue-maker scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 22d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 933 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/issue-maker — capture-only issue thread
This skill switches the whole thread into issue-capture mode and keeps it there. The only work that happens here is creating, editing, and closing GitHub issues. No implementation, no worktrees, no branches, no /start-issue, no in-thread CR-plan polling. Capture mode is a session invariant — it never turns off mid-thread.
TOP-LEVEL RULE — reflect before you file (NON-NEGOTIABLE)
Never pass a user's sentence straight through to
gh issue create. Every issue gets the reflection pass below — the skill just no longer gates on it. Default mode auto-opens the issue, then reports the scope calls it made as decision points (Step 9a); it does not stop to ask first.
Why this is rule #1 — the LLM pass-through bias. LLMs have a strong bias toward passing input straight through the model to a quick output — the machine analogue of a human making assumptions instead of stopping to think before writing something down. Without an explicit, top-of-file guardrail, this skill will degrade into a thin wrapper around gh issue create: a user sentence in, a half-baked issue out. The reflection discipline is the entire point of the skill. Do not water it down or "optimize" it away under time pressure. Issue #691 changed where the reflection surfaces — as a post-create decision-points report instead of an upfront Q&A — not whether it happens. Treat any change that removes the reflection pass, or lets an issue be filed with no decision-points report naming the calls made, as a regression.
Run this reflection pass on every issue, before and after drafting:
- Scope check (narrow): "Is this tighter than it sounds — is the real ask just X?"
- Scope check (expand): "Is there an adjacent concern (Y) that should ride along so the change is coherent?"
- Split check: "This sounds like 2+ distinct issues — should it be split into subsidiary issues?"
- Sizing check (subagent fit): "This is one coherent concern — but can one Phase A/B/C pipeline land it as one reviewable PR?"
- Ambiguity: name any concrete word/phrase whose meaning materially changes the issue.
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 22d ago Changed · +30 lines eca6f839c94c
- 29d ago Changed d671f793c40a
- 1mo ago Changed · +48 lines ef0ca4cc0473
- 1mo ago Changed · +69 lines · +32 tokens per session 09363a2f9ec1
- 1mo ago Changed a2ea4603bcf9
- 1mo ago Changed · +2 lines 40e7e472338e
- 2mo ago First seen · 784 lines · 193 tokens per session scan A bcf20adf27c8
issue-maker is a skill published in the GitHub repository auerbachb/claude-code-config (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 225 tokens to every session and 24,225 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
jira
Unified Jira entry point. Routes to preview (default), create, or review subcommands.
revert
Git-aware revert that understands Draft tracks, phases, and tasks. Safely undo work at task, phase, or track level. Use when the user asks to 'revert this track', 'undo a phase', 'revert task X', or says 'roll back the last task', 'undo this work'.
standup
Generate standup summary from git history, track progress, and Jira/GitHub activity. Read-only — makes no changes to the codebase.
status
Display current progress of Draft tracks and active tasks. Shows phases, completion percentages, and blocked items.
integrations
Canonical integrations parent command. Handles external system exports and syncs. Routes intent to jira-preview or jira-create based on context.
ops
Primary router for operations, deployment, incident, and lifecycle workflows. Analyzes intent and dispatches to deploy-checklist, incident-response, standup, status, revert. Use for pre-deploy verification, handling outages, daily summaries, progress checks, and safe rollbacks.