Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to bex-co/bex-security. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bex-co/bex-security/main/.claude/skills/loop-worker/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/bex-co/bex-securityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bex-co/bex-security/loop-worker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bex-co/bex-security/loop-worker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bex-co/bex-security/loop-worker/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bex-co/bex-security/loop-worker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bex-co/bex-security/loop-worker.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Agent Snooping · line 41 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00086 | $0.01375 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.00550 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00275 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00137 |
Grade A, and why
loop-worker scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 67 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Task: Drain a .pm workstream milestone by milestone
/loop-worker <wN> — repeatedly pick the next pending milestone in workstream <wN>, implement it fully, /ship it, and continue to the next, until the workstream has no pending milestones left (or a milestone genuinely blocks). This is a long-running autonomous loop over the .pm board; it composes /pm (board reads/writes), your own implementation work, and /ship.
Parse the target workstream from $ARGUMENTS (e.g. w1). If $ARGUMENTS is empty, STOP and ask which workstream to drain — never guess.
Preconditions (verify once, up front)
git branch --show-currentismain. If not, STOP and ask (same rule as/ship).git status— note pre-existing uncommitted changes. Do not sweep unrelated changes into a milestone's ship; if the tree is dirty with work you didn't do, surface it and ask before starting.- The workstream
.pm/<wN>/README.mdexists. If not, STOP and report.
The loop
Repeat until the exit condition below:
1. Pick the next pending milestone
Read .pm/<wN>/README.md. In the ## Milestones list, pending milestones are the unchecked ones (- [ ] **mN**). Pick the lowest-numbered pending milestone that still has a live directory (.pm/<wN>/mN/, not under done/). Cross-check by listing .pm/<wN>/m*/ and its done/ folder — the checkbox and the on-disk state must agree; if they disagree, trust the task files and flag the drift.
If there are no pending milestones, go to Exit.
Announce which milestone you picked and give a one-line plan before doing work.
2. Understand the milestone
Read .pm/<wN>/mN/README.md and every task file .pm/<wN>/mN/tNNN.md (skip any already in done/). These define the scope, order, and acceptance. Milestones ship features end to end — include the SDK, docs, and container tasks alongside the CLI ones; do not stop at the code. Respect .pm/DO_NOT_DO.md and the milestone's own acceptance criteria.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 67 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A a5dec1f1aa5a
loop-worker is a skill published in the GitHub repository bex-co/bex-security (53 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 1,375 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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