wrap

A release step that checks staged code changes, creates a commit, and opens a pull request on GitHub. A pull request is a proposal to merge changes into a shared codebase.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it after implementation and review when you are ready to prepare a pull request, optionally push it, or automatically merge it under the configured conditions.
Why use it?
It adds checks for leaked secrets and risky changes before code is committed or published. Pushing and merging remain opt-in unless explicitly enabled.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/joymin5655/agent/wrap
Any agent
npx skills add joymin5655/Agent --skill wrap
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/joymin5655/Agent

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 68 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,598 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00068 $0.01598
Opus 5 $0.00034 $0.00799
Sonnet 5 $0.00014 $0.00320
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00160

Measured 2d ago against content hash cba1104da7d8, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

wrap scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/wrap/SKILL.md · 158 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 158 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

/wrap

Goal

Move from "code written and tested locally" to "PR open on GitHub" in one skill invocation, with all the safety gates intact.

Modes

Mode What it does Trigger
/wrap Commit + open PR. User pushes manually. Default.
/wrap --auto-push Commit + push + open PR. User merges. Explicit.
/wrap --auto-merge Full chain via core/infra/auto-ship.sh. Explicit.

--auto-merge requires all 4 trigger conditions from rules/policy/actions-billing-admin-merge.md to hold.

Steps

Reviews happen BEFORE wrapping — for a multi-vendor opinion on the diff, run /council-review --staged first (skills/council-review/SKILL.md).

1. Pre-flight checks (gates)

Run in order; any failure aborts before the commit.

a. gitleaks on staged diff:

gitleaks protect --staged --redact -v --config=gitleaks.toml --no-banner

Before trusting a clean result, confirm the gate is actually live with the fire drill (W-3) — it plants a synthetic secret matching the repo's own rule and asserts gitleaks catches it, so a misconfigured allowlist can't give a false all-clear:

bash core/infra/gitleaks-fire-test.sh   # PASS = gate live; FAIL = misconfigured; exit 2 = gitleaks absent (SKIP)

a2. Remote-URL credential scan (W-3) — a token baked into the push remote's URL lives in .git/config, invisible to the content scanners above:

git remote get-url origin | python3 core/git-hooks/scan-remote-url.py

Nonzero exit = the remote URL embeds a credential; strip it before pushing. (The pre-push hook also runs this, but checking here fails earlier.) a3. Memory-pollution guard — a memory plugin's session-context dump injected into a tracked instruction file (e.g. AGENTS.md) must never reach a commit:

bash core/tests/memory-pollution-guard.sh

FAIL = revert the injected block (git checkout -- <file>) before committing. b. Whitelist path scan — only files inside allowed paths should be staged. Allowed paths default to anything except secrets/, .env* (excl. .env.example). Override via hook-config.yml. c. Risk-area scan — for each of the 5 risk areas (rules/policy/security-guards.md):

  • data (e.g., migrations/*.sql) → ABORT, user must drive.
  • secrets → ABORT.
  • deploy (function bundles) → ABORT, user must drive.
  • payment → ABORT, user must drive.
  • domain-output → advisory; if net removal, ABORT. d. Council-scale pre-merge check — run the threshold script, resolved from the plugin cache or the checkout (never bare cwd-relative — a plugin install has no core/ under $PWD):
bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-$PWD}/core/infra/council-threshold.sh" --staged

A missing script is not a pass: report the check as SKIPPED (step 1's "a skipped gate is reported as skipped" rule) rather than reading its nonzero exit as "not council-scale". Exit 10 (line/file threshold or a risk-area path) AND no council/degrade review happened this session for this diff (no .agent/workers/*-review.md capture, no single-vendor degrade note) → recommend /council-review --staged and confirm with the user before committing solo. This is advisory, not a gate abort — the user can proceed anyway; it exists so a council-scale diff doesn't slip into a commit on the strength of a Claude-only review that council-escalation-gate.py never got a chance to catch (e.g. edits made without a Task/Agent dispatch).

Read the full file on GitHub · 158 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 158 lines · 68 tokens per session scan A cba1104da7d8

Subscribe to this mod's changes

wrap is a skill published in the GitHub repository joymin5655/Agent (2 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 1,598 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.