external-browser-driver

A skill for controlling a user's paired Google Chrome browser through an extension.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to discover browser targets, perform ordered page actions, and handle permission or confirmation requests for higher-risk operations.
Why use it?
It helps an agent work with specific browser windows, tabs, frames, and pages without guessing which page is active.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/oneworks-ai/app/external-browser-driver
Any agent
npx skills add oneworks-ai/app --skill external-browser-driver
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oneworks-ai/app

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 24 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 442 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00024 $0.00442
Opus 5 $0.00012 $0.00221
Sonnet 5 $0.00005 $0.00088
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00044

Measured 2d ago against content hash 0806dbd5a38c, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

external-browser-driver scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

packages/plugins/external-browser-driver/skills/external-browser-driver/SKILL.md · 19 lines

What it actually says

Browser Control

Browser Control currently controls Google Chrome through the OneWorks extension. Its browser-facing contract is transport-neutral so future extension transports, such as Firefox, can implement the same capability without renaming the product.

  1. Call chrome_capabilities before using a capability family for the first time. Missing permissions are recoverable: ask the user to grant the named group from the Chrome extension popup, then retry. The OneWorks page reports permission state but never grants Chrome permissions itself.
  2. Discover targets with chrome_windows, chrome_tabs, and chrome_frames. Never guess IDs or rely on an implicit current tab.
  3. Reuse the returned tab_id, frame_id, and document_id. Refresh the target/snapshot after TARGET_NOT_FOUND or DOCUMENT_CHANGED.
  4. Prefer execute_chrome_workflow for ordered page-local work. Independent tab workflows may be submitted together with execute_chrome_workflows.
  5. High-risk operations return CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED; describe the audit summary and wait for the user to approve it in the extension/OneWorks UI before retrying.
  6. Prefer semantic operations. Use chrome_raw, chrome_cookies.list_with_values, chrome_page.snapshot_sensitive, or chrome_page.type_sensitive only when the matching OneWorks advanced-access preference has been applied to the connected browser and capability discovery reports it enabled. Raw is a browser-session-wide superset of cookie/sensitive-field access and executes globally exclusively. Always supply the intended tab_id and expected origin; the bridge and extension additionally negotiate and enforce an exact full-URL fingerprint without exposing query or fragment values. Review the R4 preview and obtain confirmation for every use.
  7. Never claim access to Chrome Password Manager: Chrome exposes no extension API for reading or exporting saved passwords. Sensitive page operations cover only page fields, DOM, and storage. Do not request host file-system paths, host-process code execution, cross-origin bypasses outside the explicit Raw capability, or silent permission grants.
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 19 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A 0806dbd5a38c

Subscribe to this mod's changes

external-browser-driver is a skill published in the GitHub repository oneworks-ai/app (18 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 442 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.