path-traversal

A security check for file operations that build paths from user input. It checks whether a caller can use values such as ../, absolute paths, or symbolic links to reach files outside the intended folder.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it for file uploads, downloads, static-file serving, and code that opens, reads, writes, or deletes files by a user-supplied name. It helps review path canonicalization, final-location checks, and symbolic-link handling.
Why use it?
An attacker may read secrets, overwrite configuration, or write files in dangerous locations. Joining path parts alone does not always keep the final path inside the allowed directory.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/path-traversal
Any agent
npx skills add thejefflarson/soundcheck --skill path-traversal
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/thejefflarson/soundcheck

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 70 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 748 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00070 $0.00748
Opus 5 $0.00035 $0.00374
Sonnet 5 $0.00014 $0.00150
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00075

Measured 2d ago against content hash 651e31dce8f0, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

path-traversal scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/path-traversal/SKILL.md · 60 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 60 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Path Traversal Security Check (A01:2025)

What this checks

Protects against directory traversal attacks where an attacker uses ../ sequences, absolute paths, or symlinks to access files outside the intended directory. Exploitation leads to reading sensitive files (/etc/passwd, .env, private keys), overwriting configuration, or achieving remote code execution via file write.

Vulnerable patterns

  • A caller-supplied filename interpolated or concatenated into a path before opening, with no canonicalization.
  • Path-join helper used as the only defense — these collapse some .. segments but do not verify the final path stays under the intended root, and many treat an absolute caller-supplied path as overriding the base.
  • Existence or stat check on the user path that does not follow symlinks, but the subsequent read/write does — symlink escape.
  • Canonicalization performed once at handler entry, but a later file operation uses the un-canonicalized value.

Fix immediately

Flag the vulnerable code and explain the risk. Then suggest a fix that establishes these properties. Translate each property into the audited file's language and filesystem API — use that platform's documented canonicalization and symlink- resolution call.

  1. The intended root is resolved to a canonical absolute path once, up front. Everything that follows compares against the resolved root, not against a relative string that can match itself after traversal.
  2. The caller-supplied path is joined with the root, then resolved to a canonical absolute path that also follows symlinks — using the platform's real-path / canonicalize / resolve-symlinks call. Only after this does the containment check make sense.
  3. The resolved target must start with the resolved root. A mismatch means traversal or symlink escape; reject rather than fall through. Standard path-join APIs alone do not satisfy this — they collapse some .. segments but do not verify containment.
  4. The check runs before every file operation — read, write, delete, stat. A canonicalization that happens once at handler entry but is not re-applied to a later file operation is a bug.

Read the full file on GitHub · 60 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 60 lines · 70 tokens per session scan A 651e31dce8f0

Subscribe to this mod's changes

path-traversal is a skill published in the GitHub repository thejefflarson/soundcheck (20 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 70 tokens to every session and 748 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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