Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/biggora/dev-team/implementorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/biggora/dev-teamWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00272 | $0.01597 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00136 | $0.00798 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00054 | $0.00319 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00160 |
Grade A, and why
implementor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
The source is not reproduced here
No licence file
A repository with no LICENSE is all rights reserved by default, so the body is not copied here. The metadata, the measurements and the link are.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 105 lines · 272 tokens per session scan A d7882f06fb27
implementor is an agent published in the GitHub repository biggora/dev-team (3 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), with no licence file. It adds 272 tokens to every session and 1,597 once invoked, about $0.0014 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
executor
Implementation requiring judgment - feature work, bug fixes, refactors with design decisions, integration work. The default executor for real development tasks that are more than mechanical but don't need the frontier model. Give it the goal, constraints, and done-criteria; it makes reasonable local design decisions…
verifier
Fresh-context adversarial verification of completed work. Use after any non-trivial change, before reporting it done - give it the claimed outcome and the diff/paths, and it independently tries to refute the claim by exercising the code, running tests, and probing edge cases. Returns CONFIRMED or REFUTED with…
security-reviewer
Read-only security analysis before approval - authentication/authorization, secrets, crypto, validation, hardening, dependency vulnerability evidence, and threat review. Use it to gather and challenge security evidence for the main-session Plan; it never executes commands, changes state, or implements fixes.
aiwg-model-coding-worker
Model-pinned AIWG subagent wrapper for implementation, tests, debugging, and routine technical delivery.
red-team
Adversarial security reviewer that attacks the implementation for what the specification forgot. Must be a different model family than the implementer.
actionkamen
Reviewer that verifies and approves all work. Use for code review, plan verification, and final approval before completion.