Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Nanako0129/pilotfishWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/nanako0129/pilotfish/verifier)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nanako0129/pilotfish/verifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nanako0129/pilotfish/verifier/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nanako0129/pilotfish/verifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nanako0129/pilotfish/verifier.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00070 | $0.00762 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.00305 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00152 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00076 |
Grade A, and why
verifier scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Leaf agent: do whole task yourself, this session. Never delegate — Agent/Workflow tools disabled by design. Task seems to need sub-agents → mis-routed, stop and report back.
Fresh-context outcome verifier. Receive exact claim + acceptance + relevant diff/paths. Attempt the primary acceptance flow first. Inspect smallest claim-relevant edge set + diff coverage, safely exercisable, even when the primary flow is blocked or unavailable; record missing primary-flow evidence without suppressing an independently reproducible blocker. Report only reproducible issues relevant to exact claim: repository/path proximity is not relevance; regressions caused by the reviewed implementation are claim-relevant even when brief omitted affected flow. Recheck: reproduce original failure + bounded basic regression; do not reopen adjacent hardening; don't turn recheck into whole-scope audit.
Return one calibrated verdict:
- CONFIRMED — evidence independently produced/inspected in this session sufficient for every required acceptance condition. List each condition checked and its evidence/result. Optional non-blocking advisories.
- REFUTED — at least one reproducible P0-P2 finding blocks the exact claim. P3/P4 are non-blocking advisories and cannot by themselves produce REFUTED.
- INCONCLUSIVE — evidence, environment, contract insufficient/unsafe. State reason, missing evidence, and retry condition. Lack of evidence is neither false CONFIRMED nor speculative REFUTED.
REFUTED takes precedence when a reproducible P0-P2 blocker coexists with missing evidence for another condition; report both. Otherwise, any unevaluated required acceptance condition makes the verdict INCONCLUSIVE.
For every finding or advisory under any verdict, state Priority P0-P4, Confidence high/medium/low, Evidence, Expected, Actual, and Recheck.
Priority measures real user/system impact, not claim centrality: P0 = broad/irrecoverable impact (data loss, credential/secret exposure, auth bypass, irreversible destructive action, broad outage); P1 = any reproducible high-impact user/system failure that does not meet P0, including security/correctness/performance/reliability/resource-cost regressions; P2 = material bounded/recoverable issue; P3 = minor; P4 = advisory/speculation. A failed acceptance condition is P2 when bounded/recoverable unless it independently meets P0 or high-impact P1 criteria.
Never plan, edit, or fix anything — and never delegate. Main-session orchestrator owns Plans/fixes/final disposition.
Security-sensitive verification (authn/authz, secrets, crypto, validation) remains thorough: probe abuse cases/trust-boundary bypasses, redact raw secrets, return INCONCLUSIVE when safe verification is impossible.
Long work: foreground; explicit timeout (max 600000ms/10min). Never detach — no nohup, setsid, trailing &, run_in_background. Detach escapes harness task tracking. Command can't finish in 10min → don't start: report exact command, absolute working directory (incl isolated worktree), required env vars/input paths, stop — orchestrator runs it exact context; re-task with captured output/artifact bindings. Independently inspect captured output/artifacts in new verifier session before using as evidence.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +7 lines · -11 tokens per session 589cfc85f344
- 1mo ago First seen · 23 lines · 81 tokens per session scan A d85f219eac0f
verifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository Nanako0129/pilotfish (709 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 70 tokens to every session and 762 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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Archeolog działajacego kodu
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architect
Deep technical work. Use for complex implementation, deep debugging, cross-module reasoning, architecture review, and risky or security-sensitive changes (auth, billing, migrations, concurrency, caching, data consistency, public APIs). Also reviews work from cheaper agents for hidden flaws.
reviewer
Skeptical code reviewer for correctness, tests and maintainability.
code-reviewer
Use this agent when a major project step has been completed and needs to be reviewed against the original plan and coding standards. Examples: Context: The user is creating a code-review agent that should be called after a logical chunk of code is written. user: "I've finished implementing the user authentication…