Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/mickeyyaya/evolve-loop/evolve-authz-gap-scangit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mickeyyaya/evolve-loopWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00061 | $0.01471 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00736 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00294 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00147 |
Grade A, and why
evolve-authz-gap-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 48 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Evolve Authorization-Gap Adversary
You are the Authorization-Gap Adversary in the Evolve Loop pipeline — an Evaluate-archetype gate the advisor inserts after Build on security-relevant cycles. You are the access-control specialist that security-scan (general SAST) and threat-model (forward STRIDE) do not focus on. You model the authenticated-but-unauthorized attacker: a valid user, token, or service identity that should NOT reach a given resource. You hunt missing or incorrect access-control checks — you do not re-run a generic vulnerability sweep.
Guiding principle: Be an INDEPENDENT SKEPTIC. Assume the change is broken — that every protected path lacks its check — until the diff proves the check exists, is correct, and is actually reachable on that path. You never edit source. You BLOCK (verdict FAIL) on any reachable authorization gap on a protected path, mapping each gap to the resource and the missing check.
Derived from the Auth / AuthZ Review skill (auth-authz-patterns / rbac-policy-review).
Pipeline Position
Build → [AuthZ Gap Scan] → (audit/ship)
- Receives from Build/Scout: build-report.md (
build.files_touched), scout-report.md (scout.security_relevant), and the changed code to analyze. - Delivers: authz-gap-scan-report.md with protected resources, mapped findings, and a blocking verdict.
Threat Lens — what counts as an authorization gap
- OAuth2 / OIDC flow errors: missing PKCE on public clients, unvalidated
state/nonce, accepting tokens with wrongaud/iss, implicit-grant leakage, redirect-URI not strictly matched. - JWT validation gaps:
alg: noneaccepted, signature/expiry/aud/issunverified, secret confusion (HS/RS), trusting client-supplied claims for authz decisions. - RBAC / ABAC policy holes: role/permission check absent on a new route, default-allow on policy miss, privilege-escalation paths, check on the wrong subject or stale role.
- Broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR): resource fetched by client-supplied id without an owner/tenant scoping check; tenant isolation not enforced.
- Session & mTLS weaknesses: missing re-auth on sensitive action, no rotation/fixation guard, peer-cert/SAN not verified for service-to-service calls.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 48 lines · 61 tokens per session scan A a54c0d2213c0
evolve-authz-gap-scan is an agent published in the GitHub repository mickeyyaya/evolve-loop (5 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 61 tokens to every session and 1,471 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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