multi-agent-trust

A security check for software in which multiple AI agents call or message one another. It checks whether each agent is authenticated, authorized, and given only the access it needs.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when building agent teams, delegating work to subagents, or passing results between AI workers. It helps review signed or authenticated calls, permission limits, sender verification, and message validation.
Why use it?
If one agent is compromised, unchecked messages or shared credentials can let it control the rest of the workflow. A worker with the coordinator’s full access can also affect unrelated systems.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/multi-agent-trust
Any agent
npx skills add thejefflarson/soundcheck --skill multi-agent-trust
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/thejefflarson/soundcheck

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 67 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 679 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00067 $0.00679
Opus 5 $0.00034 $0.00340
Sonnet 5 $0.00013 $0.00136
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00068

Measured 2d ago against content hash 31b0377de08a, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

multi-agent-trust scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/multi-agent-trust/SKILL.md · 62 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 62 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Multi-Agent Trust Boundaries (LLM08:2025)

What this checks

Detects agent-to-agent calls that lack authentication, authorization, or permission scoping. When agents blindly trust messages from other agents, a compromised or malicious agent can hijack the entire pipeline.

Vulnerable patterns

  • Inter-agent call dispatched with no authentication header or signed token
  • Worker or subagent initialized with the orchestrator's full credentials and complete tool scope
  • Output from one agent passed as input to the next without schema validation
  • Receiver that trusts a sender identity claim with no cryptographic verification

Fix immediately

Flag the vulnerable call site and explain the risk. Then suggest a fix that establishes these properties:

  1. Authentication on every agent-to-agent call. A shared secret, signed token, or mTLS credential is attached by the caller and verified by the receiver before any task runs. A sender-name field is not authentication.
  2. Least privilege per agent. Each agent is initialized with the smallest set of tools, credentials, and scopes it needs to complete its task — never the orchestrator's full set. A compromised worker should not have the keys to compromise the rest of the pipeline.
  3. Schema validation on every received message. Treat messages from other agents as untrusted input: validate against a schema, reject unexpected fields, and refuse to execute free-form instructions embedded in the payload.
  4. No blind execution of peer-supplied instructions. Agent output that names a tool or action is routed through the same policy gate as a user request, not auto-dispatched.

Translate each principle to the transport, auth library, and validator of the audited code. Use the framework's documented auth-middleware and schema-validation APIs — do not roll your own.

Verification

  • For every outbound agent-to-agent call present, an auth header or signed token is attached
  • For every agent-to-agent receiver handler present, the auth token is verified before processing
  • Each agent is initialized with the minimum permissions needed for its task
  • For every response received from another agent, the payload is validated against a schema before use
  • No agent blindly executes instructions received from another agent

Read the full file on GitHub · 62 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 62 lines · 67 tokens per session scan A 31b0377de08a

Subscribe to this mod's changes

multi-agent-trust is a skill published in the GitHub repository thejefflarson/soundcheck (20 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 679 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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