sensitive-disclosure

A security check for confidential information sent to or returned by large language model APIs. It covers personal data, credentials, secrets, prompts, conversation history, and model responses.

In plain words
What is it for?
Reviewing LLM prompts and responses, checking redaction of personal data and secrets, separating users' stored context, and securing logging and retrieval data.
Why use it?
It helps prevent private information from being exposed through prompts, logs, stored context, or unfiltered model output.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/thejefflarson/soundcheck/sensitive-disclosure
Any agent
npx skills add thejefflarson/soundcheck --skill sensitive-disclosure
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/thejefflarson/soundcheck

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 70 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 821 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00070 $0.00821
Opus 5 $0.00035 $0.00411
Sonnet 5 $0.00014 $0.00164
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00082

Measured 2d ago against content hash 0f455b48bf6c, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

sensitive-disclosure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/sensitive-disclosure/SKILL.md · 55 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 55 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Sensitive Information Disclosure (OWASP LLM06:2025)

What this checks

Prevents confidential data from leaking through LLM inputs or outputs. LLMs may memorize, echo, or inference-time expose PII, credentials, and business secrets embedded in prompts — to current users, future users, or via model extraction.

Vulnerable patterns

  • Whole user or account records interpolated into a system or user prompt
  • API keys, database passwords, or other credentials baked into prompt strings
  • Returning raw LLM responses to callers without an output-redaction gate — the response can echo data injected via retrieval or memory
  • Conversation history or vector-store writes that mix multiple users' content without partitioning by user identity
  • Logging or telemetry that emits prompts and completions unredacted

Fix immediately

Flag the vulnerable code, explain the risk, and suggest a fix establishing these properties. Translate to the language and framework of the audited file — use that stack's secrets manager, logging library, and redaction helpers; do not import names from a different stack.

  1. PII is redacted or pseudonymized before it reaches the model. Replace raw records with opaque identifiers, or scrub values matching known sensitive patterns (SSN, email, card numbers, health identifiers). A prompt-level instruction like "don't repeat personal details" is not sufficient.
  2. No credentials appear in prompt strings. Load them server-side from environment or a secrets manager and never interpolate into a system prompt — even "just for auth context".
  3. Every return site for an LLM response passes through an output-redaction gate before the response leaves the process. This catches data that leaked in via retrieval or memory.
  4. If conversation history or a memory/vector store is persisted, records are keyed or partitioned by user identity so one session's context cannot be retrieved by another.
  5. If prompts or completions are logged, the same redaction helper runs before emission — otherwise logs become the leak.

Read the full file on GitHub · 55 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 55 lines · 70 tokens per session scan A 0f455b48bf6c

Subscribe to this mod's changes

sensitive-disclosure is a skill published in the GitHub repository thejefflarson/soundcheck (20 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 70 tokens to every session and 821 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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