Identity-log triage workflow — anomaly patterns per provider (AWS CloudTrail, Azure AD/Entra, Google Workspace, Okta), session and token misuse, MFA-bypass signals, conditional-access evasion, and cross-provider correlation. Produces a prioritized finding list routed to ir-runbook or detection-engineer.
Malware triage workflow — sandbox output analysis (CAPE/Hybrid-Analysis/ANY.RUN/Joe Sandbox), YARA rule scaffolding at pattern level, IOC extraction, and TTP mapping to MITRE ATT&CK. Sandbox-only discipline; do not detonate in production or without an isolated runtime.
EU NIS2 Directive (2022/2555) gap analysis — scope determination (essential vs important entities across 18 sectors), governance obligations (Art 20), 10 baseline risk-management measures (Art 21), incident reporting timelines (Art 23), and Dutch implementation via the Cyberbeveiligingswet.
Pentest report builder — executive summary, methodology, finding template with CVSS v3.1/v4.0 scoring, reproduction steps, impact and remediation per finding, remediation roadmap, retest sign-off, and appendices. Works for web-app, network, red-team, and bug-bounty reports.
Phishing-simulation campaign workflow — RoE and ethical-scope template, population segmentation, pretexting patterns (HR/IT/finance/vendor/calendar), infrastructure (sender domain, SPF/DKIM/DMARC, tracking), click-rate and credential-success metrics, opt-out and duty of care, NL/EU AVG context for employee monitoring.
Post-exploitation methodology mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics — privilege escalation, credential access, discovery, lateral movement, persistence and defense evasion across Windows/Linux/cloud. Pattern-level technique categories with D3FEND defensive counters and a detection opportunity per step.
Purple-team operations — structured detection validation against MITRE ATT&CK through planned emulation, measured coverage gaps, joint red+blue debrief, and tracked closure via D3FEND mapping. Bridge between the pentest bundle and the blue bundle.
Risk-management workflow — risk identification, qualitative and quantitative analysis (likelihood × impact, FAIR basis), evaluation against risk appetite, treatment (avoid/mitigate/transfer/accept), heatmaps and trend, with ISO 31000 and ISO 27005 as the methodology base.
SAST orchestration for Semgrep, CodeQL and SonarQube. Covers tool selection, ruleset curation, PR-comment integration, noise reduction with baselines, and language-specific linters (bandit, gosec, brakeman, eslint-security) when they add coverage.
Detect and remediate leaked credentials in code and git-history — entropy/regex scanning with gitleaks/trufflehog/detect-secrets, rotate-first incident response, and pre-commit/CI gating to prevent reoccurrence.
Security review workflow for a PR, feature or codebase — scope, automated scans, manual OWASP/CWE pattern-check, prioritize and report. Uses secure-coding as pattern library.
SOC 2 Type II prep — AICPA Trust Services Criteria (Security required plus Availability/Confidentiality/Processing Integrity/Privacy), Common Criteria CC1–CC9, Type I vs Type II choice, evidence-collection rhythm, auditor-friendly packaging, Complementary User Entity Controls.
Spring Boot security review — Spring Security config (SecurityFilterChain), OAuth2/OIDC client and resource-server, method-level @PreAuthorize, JWT validation, actuator endpoint lockdown, CSRF model for web vs API, and recent Spring CVE patterns (Spring4Shell, SpEL injection, authorization bypasses).
Software supply-chain defense — SBOM generation (CycloneDX/SPDX), SLSA build provenance, artifact signing with sigstore/cosign, dependency-confusion and typosquat defense, and consumer-side verification of what you pull in.
Structured red-team pass over your own output — surface assumptions, gaps, failure modes and security red flags before shipping.
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