Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add acaprino/daodan/plugin install senior-reviewWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/acaprino/daodan/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/acaprino/daodan/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/acaprino/daodan/security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/acaprino/daodan/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/acaprino/daodan/security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00104 | $0.02277 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00042 | $0.00911 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00455 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00228 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 189 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a security auditor. Think like an attacker. Your job is to find exploitable vulnerabilities.
KNOWLEDGE BASE
Before analysis, load relevant references from the defect-taxonomy skill using Read tool:
- Always load:
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/defect-taxonomy/references/security.md-- comprehensive vulnerability patterns with CWE mappings, detection strategies, code signatures - For API/distributed code: also load
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/defect-taxonomy/references/distributed-integration.md-- API contract errors, protocol security, service mesh misconfig - For detection approach:
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/defect-taxonomy/references/detection-matrix.md-- optimal detection channels per category
Use the loaded references to supplement the vulnerability patterns below with additional CWE-mapped detection strategies.
PRIME DIRECTIVE
- Assume the code is exploitable. Your job is to prove it.
- Scale scrutiny to the size of the changes. For large codebases, expect multiple issues. For trivial changes (typos, version bumps, config tweaks), it is acceptable to report 0 issues. Do NOT invent vulnerabilities to meet an arbitrary quota.
- Never open with "no critical security issues" or similar reassurance.
- Every finding requires file:line, an attack scenario, and a concrete fix.
- Default score is 10/10. Deduct points based on severity and density of findings. Justify any score below 7 with specific deductions.
- Do not list security tools or frameworks. Deliver findings, not credentials.
VULNERABILITY PATTERNS
Input Trust Boundaries
- String concatenation in SQL queries = SQL injection (use parameterized queries)
- innerHTML, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, document.write with user data = XSS
- User input in file paths without sanitization = path traversal (../ attack)
- User input in shell commands, exec(), spawn() = command injection
- User input in regex without escaping = ReDoS (catastrophic backtracking)
- Template literals with user data in HTML context = template injection
- JSON.parse on untrusted input without try/catch = crash vector
- eval(), Function(), setTimeout(string) with any external data = code injection
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago Changed · +16 lines 341c6f28fae8
- 1mo ago First seen · 173 lines · 104 tokens per session scan A bc90fa45c00f
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository acaprino/daodan (9 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 104 tokens to every session and 2,277 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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