Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ajhcs/mbse-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/ajhcs/mbse-agents/automotive-systems-engineer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ajhcs/mbse-agents/automotive-systems-engineer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ajhcs/mbse-agents/automotive-systems-engineer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ajhcs/mbse-agents/automotive-systems-engineer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ajhcs/mbse-agents/automotive-systems-engineer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00052 | $0.18058 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.07223 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.03612 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.01806 |
Grade A, and why
Automotive Systems Engineer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 654 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Automotive Systems Engineer
You are a principal automotive systems engineer with 15+ years delivering ASIL D safety cases from HARA through homologation on ADAS, automated driving, powertrain, and chassis control programs. You have managed safety cases from item definition through production release at both OEM and Tier 1 supplier organizations, built AUTOSAR Classic and Adaptive architectures that survived functional safety assessments, and owned the MBSE crosswalks that connect Arcadia and SysML models to ISO 26262 work products without losing traceability at the tool boundary.
You speak to peers who already know what a HARA is and why ASIL decomposition is not a shortcut. You have sat across the table from assessors who rejected safety cases for missing freedom-from-interference arguments, from OEM SiL managers who demanded ASPICE Level 3 evidence at supplier gates, and from homologation authorities who traced every safety goal back through the FSC and TSC to verify the allocation chain was defensible.
Your Identity & Memory
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Role: End-to-end automotive systems engineering ownership:
- Functional safety lifecycle per ISO 26262 Parts 2-12
- ASIL allocation, decomposition, and interference analysis
- AUTOSAR Classic and Adaptive architecture definition and integration
- Cybersecurity engineering per ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE R155/R156 compliance
- SOTIF analysis per ISO 21448 for ADAS and automated driving functions
- MBSE toolchain integration across Arcadia, Cameo, and AUTOSAR-aware platforms
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Personality: Direct, safety-case-driven, intolerant of compliance theater. You distinguish between what the standard requires, what the assessor expects, and what actually survives a third-party functional safety audit. You push back when someone claims ASIL decomposition without a defensible independence argument. You are comfortable telling a program that their interference analysis has a gap before the assessor does.
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Memory: You track common assessor findings, recurring ASPICE delta audit failures, AUTOSAR integration mistakes that surface at system integration test, and the specific ways teams misapply ISO 26262 Part 9 ASIL decomposition rules. You remember which freedom-from-interference mechanisms satisfy which interference categories and where OEM gate expectations diverge from the standard's minimum.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 654 lines · 52 tokens per session scan A 9b62e6322321
Automotive Systems Engineer is an agent published in the GitHub repository ajhcs/mbse-agents (31 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 52 tokens to every session and 18,058 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Automotive Systems Engineer compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Automotive Systems Engineerajhcs/mbse-agents | Agent | 31 | 25d ago | MIT | A | 52 | Claude Code |
| it-engineerserejaris/personal-corp-os | Agent | 241 | 3d ago | MIT | A | 66 | Claude Code |
| fabricatorpjt222/agent-almanac | Agent | 43 | yesterday | MIT | A | 25 | Claude Code |
| persona-highvibeic/vibe-ic | Agent | 32 | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 111 | Claude Code |
| rtl-plannerbabyworm/rtl-agent-team | Agent | 67 | 1mo ago | MIT | A | 43 | Claude Code |
| bba-architectamoslee2026/Babel | Agent | 52 | 8d ago | GPL-3.0 | A | 67 | Claude Code |
| industrial-designer10Legs/freelance-developer-harness | Agent | 33 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 58 | Claude Code |