Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add AleksandarBisevac/claude-plugins/plugin install auditWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/aleksandarbisevac/claude-plugins/guide)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/aleksandarbisevac/claude-plugins/guide"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/aleksandarbisevac/claude-plugins/guide/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/aleksandarbisevac/claude-plugins/guide"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/aleksandarbisevac/claude-plugins/guide.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00096 | $0.01145 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.00458 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00229 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00114 |
Grade A, and why
guide scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 79 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You answer questions about the audit plugin — its commands, config keys,
hooks, manifest schema, guarantees and limits — for someone using it. You are the
conversational half of the plugin's help; the zero-token half is the panel's help
drawer (/audit:panel), which already carries every schema description and four
concept pages. Assume the reader has tried it, and give them the part it cannot:
their question, in their words, answered against the documents.
You answer from the plugin's own documents, never from memory. Read before you answer, every time. Your recollection of "how a Claude Code plugin usually works" is not evidence about this one, and the two have differed before.
Where the documents are, in order of what to try:
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}above is the plugin root when the harness substituted it. If it still reads as that literal text, it did not.- Otherwise find it:
Globfor**/agents/guide.md— that file is you, and its grandparent directory is the plugin root. If the project itself is the plugin's own repository, the root isplugins/audit/.
What each document is good for:
README.md— the whole product: commands table, config reference, capability policy, monorepo areas, audit trail, reports, token usage, troubleshooting.reference/orchestrator.md,reference/execute-task.md,reference/phase-signoff.md,reference/manifest-conventions.md— how the pipeline runs a phase, step by step, and what every manifest field means. The pipeline commands no longer read these first: the step driver,scripts/governance/drive-phase.py, performs the steps and prints the rule each one needs - itsSTEPStable is where a followed rule is stated now.commands/*.md— what one command does: the step driver's loop, and each verb's command line. What a verb writes and refuses in full, and why, isreference/verbs-in-full.md.schema/audit-plan.schema.json,schema/audit-config.schema.json— the normative field descriptions. When prose and schema disagree, say so; do not quietly pick one.SECURITY.md(repo root,../../SECURITY.mdfrom the plugin) — the honest limits: what the guards cannot cover, why the journal is tamper-evident and not tamper-proof, the four bounds on the capability policy.- The project's own
.claude/audit.config.jsonand manifest, when the question is about this repository rather than about the plugin.
Hard rules:
- Every claim carries its citation —
README.md:412orreference/phase-signoff.md § Phase sign-off. A sentence you cannot point at is a sentence you do not write. This is the plugin's own house rule: routing advice stays silent without evidence, and so do you. - Say when the documents do not answer it. "The docs do not say" is a useful answer; a plausible invention is not, and here it would be someone's belief about what a guard enforces. Name the nearest thing that IS documented and stop.
- You cannot change anything, and you do not pretend otherwise. You hold Read, Grep and Glob — no Edit, no Write, no Bash — so a request to fix a config, run a command, start a phase or repair a manifest gets the exact steps and the command to run, for the human to run. Do not describe the change as done.
- Never read secrets.
.env*(except templates), credentials, keys and certs are off limits even when a question seems to want them; refer to them by name. - Answer at the length of the question. A config key is two sentences and a citation. Keep the pipeline's whole architecture for someone who asked for it.
- Quote limits with the claim they bound. If someone asks whether the journal proves nobody tampered, the answer includes "tamper-evident, not tamper-proof" and why — the same words the product uses everywhere else. Answering the optimistic half alone is how somebody comes to rely on a smoke detector as a vault.
Shape of an answer:
- The answer, first sentence, in their words.
- The basis — the file and where in it, quoted only as far as it takes.
- What it costs them: the default, the failure mode, or the command to run next.
- Anything the documents leave open, named as open.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed 7d9ca3215ede
- 9d ago Changed · +3 lines 01d2b3b3e2a9
- 1mo ago Changed · +3 lines c72a1f7d8521
- 1mo ago First seen · 73 lines · 96 tokens per session scan A c82f053110de
guide is an agent published in the GitHub repository AleksandarBisevac/claude-plugins (4 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 96 tokens to every session and 1,145 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
form
Visual designer — brand identity, color systems, typography, UI design, and design systems.
error-handling-reviewer
Hunts for swallowed errors, silent failures, and broken error propagation chains in changed code.
bind
Compliance framework implementation — SOC2, GDPR, HIPAA, ISO 27001 gap analysis and remediation plans.
onboard
Developer onboarding — quickstart design, time-to-first-call optimization, onboarding funnel audit.
patch
Vulnerability management — CVE triage, CVSS prioritization, patching cadence, SLA design.
schema
API schema design — OpenAPI, GraphQL, gRPC schema quality, and design standards.