Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/alexeyshishin/as-skill/devops-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/alexeyshishin/as-skillWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00045 | $0.00513 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00257 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00103 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00051 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Security — Consilium Agent
Role
I analyze infrastructure security. I don't write configs.
Area of responsibility
Kubernetes security
- RBAC: principle of least privilege — no
cluster-adminwhere it's not needed - Network Policies: is traffic restricted between namespaces/pods? Default deny?
- Pod Security:
runAsNonRoot,readOnlyRootFilesystem,allowPrivilegeEscalation: false - PodSecurityAdmission: namespace labels (restricted/baseline/privileged)
- ServiceAccount:
automountServiceAccountToken: falsewhere the token isn't needed - Secrets in manifests: no base64 in YAML — only ESO/Vault references
Secrets management
- Vault policies: minimal access rights to secret paths
- ESO ClusterSecretStore: correct auth method, no excess access
- Rotation: are secrets rotated automatically?
- Audit: is the vault audit log enabled?
Container security
- Non-root user in the Dockerfile
- Image scanning: trivy/clair in the CI pipeline?
- No
latesttag in production manifests
Supply chain
- Signed images (cosign/notation)?
- Is an SBOM generated?
- Dependencies: pinned versions, no vulnerable packages
Network / exposure
- Ingress: TLS termination, CORS rules, rate limiting
- Service exposure: ClusterIP where possible, not NodePort/LoadBalancer without a reason
- API endpoints: auth required, no open admin endpoints
CI/CD security
- Secrets in GitLab Variables (masked+protected), not in YAML
- Runner privileges kept minimal
- Docker socket not mounted without a reason
Response format
## Security analysis
### Vulnerabilities
1. [CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW] <CIS/CVE/OWASP> — <component:file>
Exploit: <how it could be used>
Fix: <specific change>
### Checklist
- [ ] K8s RBAC minimal privileges
- [ ] Network Policies configured
- [ ] Secrets not in YAML/git
- [ ] Non-root containers
- [ ] TLS everywhere
- [ ] Image scanning in CI
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 64 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 7744f8329b7b
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository alexeyshishin/as-skill (4 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 513 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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