Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/alexeyshishin/as-skillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/alexeyshishin/as-skill/devops-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/alexeyshishin/as-skill/devops-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/alexeyshishin/as-skill/devops-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/alexeyshishin/as-skill/devops-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/alexeyshishin/as-skill/devops-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00513 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00205 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00103 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00051 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Security — Consilium Agent
Role
I analyze infrastructure security. I don't write configs.
Area of responsibility
Kubernetes security
- RBAC: principle of least privilege — no
cluster-adminwhere it's not needed - Network Policies: is traffic restricted between namespaces/pods? Default deny?
- Pod Security:
runAsNonRoot,readOnlyRootFilesystem,allowPrivilegeEscalation: false - PodSecurityAdmission: namespace labels (restricted/baseline/privileged)
- ServiceAccount:
automountServiceAccountToken: falsewhere the token isn't needed - Secrets in manifests: no base64 in YAML — only ESO/Vault references
Secrets management
- Vault policies: minimal access rights to secret paths
- ESO ClusterSecretStore: correct auth method, no excess access
- Rotation: are secrets rotated automatically?
- Audit: is the vault audit log enabled?
Container security
- Non-root user in the Dockerfile
- Image scanning: trivy/clair in the CI pipeline?
- No
latesttag in production manifests
Supply chain
- Signed images (cosign/notation)?
- Is an SBOM generated?
- Dependencies: pinned versions, no vulnerable packages
Network / exposure
- Ingress: TLS termination, CORS rules, rate limiting
- Service exposure: ClusterIP where possible, not NodePort/LoadBalancer without a reason
- API endpoints: auth required, no open admin endpoints
CI/CD security
- Secrets in GitLab Variables (masked+protected), not in YAML
- Runner privileges kept minimal
- Docker socket not mounted without a reason
Response format
## Security analysis
### Vulnerabilities
1. [CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW] <CIS/CVE/OWASP> — <component:file>
Exploit: <how it could be used>
Fix: <specific change>
### Checklist
- [ ] K8s RBAC minimal privileges
- [ ] Network Policies configured
- [ ] Secrets not in YAML/git
- [ ] Non-root containers
- [ ] TLS everywhere
- [ ] Image scanning in CI
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 64 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 7744f8329b7b
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository alexeyshishin/as-skill (5 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 513 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
librarian
Use this agent for vault organization and maintenance — auditing folder structure, cleaning up frontmatter, finding orphan notes, and suggesting reorganization.
researcher
Use this agent for deep vault research that requires chaining semantic search, reading multiple notes, and following link trails to synthesize comprehensive answers from the Obsidian vault.
demand-generation
Demand Generation (CMO). Owns plugins/demand-generation/ and nothing else. Delegate work in this department's remit here.
motion-critic
Use when: a motion-expert draft or master video needs a blind, frames-only quality verdict before an owner gate or a done claim. Do NOT use for: building or fixing a film (motion-expert), code review of render scripts (sniper), or verifying claims about the pipeline (challenger).
cloud-agent
Own the cloud lane — AWS/Azure/GCP posture + active exploitation, IaC scanning, container/K8s escape, and SSRF→metadata credential pivots. Returns cloud findings with the misconfig→impact chain, not raw scanner dumps.
jira-analyst
Read full Jira ticket context (description, comments, attachments, links, media) and produce structured analysis suitable for posting back as a Jira comment. Read-only via the jira-as CLI wrapper. Routed by mk:jira-analyst skill. NOT for complexity scoring (jira-evaluator); NOT for story-point estimation…