security-review

A security-review agent for code involving authentication, permissions, tokens, or container security settings. It checks the code against documented security standards before changes are committed.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review authentication and authorization flows, access to user resources, token handling, and security contexts in container specifications.
Why use it?
It helps catch missing permission checks, incorrect user or service credentials, and other security problems before they reach the repository.

Agent for Claude Code

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/ambient-code/platform/security-review
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ambient-code/platform

Made for: Claude Code.

Per session 39 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,229 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00039 $0.01229
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.00615
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00246
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00123

Measured yesterday against content hash c8804cea7434, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

Copies of this mod

1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:

.claude/agents/security-review.md · 129 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 129 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Security Review Agent

Cross-cutting security review against documented security standards.

Context

Load these files before running checks:

  1. specs/standards/security/security.spec.md

Checks

S1: User token for user operations (Blocker)

Handlers must use GetK8sClientsForRequest(c) for user-initiated operations. Service account only for privileged operations after RBAC validation.

# Find handler functions using service account clients without RBAC validation
rg -n "GetK8sClientsForRequest|serviceAccountClient|saClient" components/ --glob="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go"
# Flag handlers that don't call GetK8sClientsForRequest (manual review for user-flow endpoints)
rg -n "func.*Handler\|func.*Handle" components/backend/ --glob="*.go" -A 5 | grep -v "GetK8sClientsForRequest" | grep "func.*Handler"

S2: RBAC before resource access (Critical)

SelfSubjectAccessReview (or equivalent authz check) should precede user-scoped resource access.

# Find SelfSubjectAccessReview usage — flag user-resource endpoints that lack it
rg -n "SelfSubjectAccessReview|SubjectAccessReview" components/ --glob="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go"
# Find resource access patterns without preceding RBAC check (flag for manual review)
rg -n "client\.Get\|client\.List\|client\.Create" components/backend/ --glob="*.go" -B 10 | grep -v "SelfSubjectAccessReview"

S3: Token redaction in all outputs (Blocker)

No tokens in logs, errors, or API responses. Use len(token) for logging.

# Find token variables logged directly (should use len(token) instead)
rg -n "log.*[Tt]oken\|Sprintf.*[Tt]oken\|Error.*[Tt]oken" components/ --glob="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go" | grep -v "len(token)"
# Find token values in response bodies
rg -n '"token"\s*:\s*[a-zA-Z]' components/ --glob="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go"

S4: Input validation (Major)

DNS labels validated, URLs parsed, no raw newlines for log injection.

# Find URL construction without url.Parse validation
rg -n "url\.Parse\|url\.ParseRequestURI" components/ --glob="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go"
# Find log statements with user-controlled input (potential log injection via newlines)
rg -n 'log\.(Info|Error|Warn).*(name|label|input|param|query)' components/ --glob="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go"
# Find DNS label handling without regex validation
rg -n "IsDNSLabel\|dns1123\|ValidateName" components/ --glob="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go"

Read the full file on GitHub · 129 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 129 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A c8804cea7434

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security-review is an agent published in the GitHub repository ambient-code/platform (129 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 1,229 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

Related

Other agents, from other repositories