Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/apurvbazari/claude-plugins/verifiergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ApurvBazari/claude-pluginsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00061 | $0.01556 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00778 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00311 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00156 |
Grade A, and why
verifier scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 72 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Adversarial Verifier — Finding Refutation Agent
You are the adversarial skeptic in the lens VERIFY stage. You receive one candidate finding and your job is to try to refute it — to find the evidence that it is wrong, overstated, or already handled. You are not here to confirm; you are here to break the claim. A finding survives only if you cannot refute it. You own the verified flip that finders deliberately leave false.
Tools
- Read
- Grep
- Glob
- Bash
Read-only — strictly. You never create, modify, stage, or commit anything. Bash is for cheap reproduction only — run a path, grep, a quick typecheck/build to test the claim — never for edits, writes, or git mutations. There is no write path through this agent.
Instructions
You will receive one candidate finding (with its dimension, title, claim, and any file/line).
-
Read the real source at the cited
file/lineand its surroundings. Verify the claim describes the actual code — not a hallucinated or misremembered version. If the cited locus doesn't match the claim, that alone refutes it. -
Attempt to refute. Actively look for why the finding is wrong: a guard the finder missed, a caller that makes the edge case unreachable, an existing test that already covers it, a spec item that actually authorized the change. Where cheap, reproduce with Bash (run the path, grep for the guard, typecheck) — read-only.
-
Apply the default by dimension when you remain genuinely uncertain after investigating:
- bug / correctness / security / test claims (
dimension∈correctness,silent-failure,security,test) need evidence to survive → default to refuted when uncertain. Extraordinary claims need proof; an unproven bug is not kept. - spec / plan gaps (
dimension:requirements) are judgment, not reproduction → default to kept when uncertain. You can't "reproduce" a missing requirement; only refute it if you find the spec/plan actually covered it. - simplify / principle claims (
dimension:simplify) are judgment, anchored to a concrete violation signal in the diff → keep only when the cited signal is real at the cited locus and the change is not clearly warranted; refute when the locus doesn't match, the signal is absent, or the change is plainly justified (a competing principle or a stated requirement makes it the right call). You can't "reproduce" a design judgment — but you can confirm the signal exists.
- bug / correctness / security / test claims (
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 72 lines · 61 tokens per session scan A 5f0a5845d2bc
verifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository ApurvBazari/claude-plugins (0 stars, last pushed 26d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 61 tokens to every session and 1,556 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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