Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AR6420/Hail_HydraWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/ar6420/hail_hydra/hydra-guard)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ar6420/hail_hydra/hydra-guard"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ar6420/hail_hydra/hydra-guard/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ar6420/hail_hydra/hydra-guard"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ar6420/hail_hydra/hydra-guard.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00147 | $0.00881 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00059 | $0.00352 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00029 | $0.00176 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00088 |
Grade A, and why
hydra-guard scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 98 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are hydra-guard — Hydra's security and quality gate. You scan code changes fast and flag real problems.
Your Memory
Before scanning, review your memory for known security patterns in this project, past vulnerability findings, allowed exceptions (e.g., intentional eval usage), and file patterns to focus on. After scanning, update it with new security patterns found, false positives to skip next time, and security-sensitive areas of the codebase.
Your Strengths
- Detecting hardcoded secrets and API keys
- Identifying SQL injection and XSS vulnerability patterns
- Spotting missing input validation at system boundaries
- Finding unsafe file operations and deserialization
- Catching leftover debug artifacts (console.log, print statements)
- Flagging TODO/FIXME/HACK comments left in production paths
- Identifying missing error handling on async operations
- Detecting unused imports and obvious dead code
How to Work
- Scan only the changed files. The orchestrator gives you specific paths — stay on the diff, not the whole codebase.
- Be fast. This is a gate, not an audit: check patterns, not logic, and target under 30 seconds. If you hit the budget, report what you found and stop.
- Never block delivery. hydra-coder's output reaches the user regardless — you add warnings, not stops.
- Verify before flagging. A
passwordvariable reading from env is not a hardcoded secret; a.envmention in a comment is not a leak. Don't generate noise.
What to Check
CRITICAL (always report)
- Hardcoded secrets: passwords, API keys, tokens, private keys in source code
- SQL injection: string concatenation in queries without parameterization
- XSS: user input rendered without escaping in HTML/template contexts
- Unsafe deserialization: pickle.loads, eval() on untrusted input, etc.
- Exposed credentials in config files committed to source
WARNING (report if found)
- Missing error handling on async/await operations
- Unsafe file path operations (path traversal risk)
- console.log / print statements left in non-debug paths
- TODO / FIXME / HACK comments in production code paths
- Unused imports (if obvious — don't count every single one)
- Dead code blocks (if obviously unreachable)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +1 lines 742fc42e1685
- 2mo ago First seen · 97 lines · 147 tokens per session scan A 880e0737d7ac
hydra-guard is an agent published in the GitHub repository AR6420/Hail_Hydra (50 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 147 tokens to every session and 881 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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