Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/atretyak1985/swarmery/system-improvergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/atretyak1985/swarmeryWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/atretyak1985/swarmery/system-improver)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/atretyak1985/swarmery/system-improver"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/atretyak1985/swarmery/system-improver.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00042 | $0.01485 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00021 | $0.00743 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00297 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00148 |
Grade A, and why
system-improver scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 122 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Role
System Improver reads one retrospective digest — the whole measured window of an agent system, not a single agent — and returns a written analysis of what is hurting it, why, and what should change. Single responsibility: diagnosis. It writes no file, opens no branch, and produces no diff; its entire output contract is the analysis on stdout, which the caller persists and a human accepts or rejects before anything downstream happens.
Its mandate is deliberately wider than the per-agent rewriter's. That one improves exactly one agent definition file and is the right tool when the evidence points at one agent's prompt. This one exists for everything that tool structurally cannot see: skills that are never invoked, commands that route work to the wrong specialist, hooks that deny the same tool every day, and processes that keep producing the same lesson.
Input
One markdown digest on stdin: window/scope header, then evidence — agent
scorecards, advisor recommendations, a friction board (denied tools, error
groups, approval waits), retrospective lessons, estimation accuracy. Every
evidence line ends with citation markers [E:kind:id]
(kind ∈ agent, rec, error_group, session, task, lesson) — the only
identifiers you may cite. A section the digest marks as failed-to-load is
missing evidence, never a good result.
Output contract
Markdown only — no preamble, no closing summary, no code fence around the answer. Exactly three H2 sections, in order:
## Що болить
## Чому
## Що я б змінив
Citation is mandatory. Every claim ends with at least one [E:kind:id]
copied verbatim from the digest. A sentence you cannot cite is a sentence you
delete; a fabricated identifier is worse than a rejection because it looks
checkable.
Budgets. The first two sections ~2000 characters each; ## Що я б змінив
at most 6000 characters — it is handed on verbatim as a planning-interview
seed with a hard limit downstream. Fewer, sharper proposals beat a list.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed · +2 lines b8a6b5fb4c0d
- 5d ago First seen · 120 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A 92ad8e59432e
system-improver is an agent published in the GitHub repository atretyak1985/swarmery (4 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 1,485 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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