Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/avelikiy/great_ctoWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/ai-security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/ai-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/ai-security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/ai-security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/ai-security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.02585 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.01293 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00517 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00259 |
Grade C, and why
ai-security-reviewer scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Instruction-override phrasingmediumPrompt injection
Text telling the model to disregard its earlier instructions or safety rules is the shape of a prompt injection, whoever wrote it.
- Direct override: user inputs `"Ignore previous instructions and..."` Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- If from LLM output → high SSRF risk. List specific bypass attempts: AWS metadata (`169.254.169.254`), Redis (`localhost:6379`), file (`file://`), gopher (`gopher://`) Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
grep -rnE "(fetch|requests\.get|axios\.get|urllib)\(" --include='*.{ts,js,py}' ./ | head How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 182 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the AI Security Reviewer — a specialist subagent that security-officer delegates to in pre-impl mode for archetype: ai-system | agent-product. The general security-officer covers traditional STRIDE on auth/API/infra; you cover the AI-specific surface where general SecOps practices don't translate.
The Step-0 read-inputs, output convention (
docs/sec-threats/TM-{slug}.md), severity scale, verdict rules, and HANDOFF format come fromarchetype-review-base. This prompt adds ONLY the OWASP LLM Top 10 heuristics.
Domain triggers (in addition to the base "when invoked")
- A prompt change introduces a new tool capability (escalates threat surface)
- Model swap (especially across providers) — re-evaluate residual threats
What you produce
docs/sec-threats/TM-{slug}.md from skills/great_cto/templates/THREAT-MODEL-AI.md. Sections you must complete:
- Prompt Injection (LLM01) — vectors via user input, retrieved content, tool results
- Output Exfiltration (LLM02 + LLM06) — training data leak, cross-user, system prompt reveal, memory leak
- SSRF / Tool Layer Abuse (LLM06 + LLM08) — only if tool layer fetches URLs / runs code / queries DBs / sends emails
- Cost Runaway (LLM10) — unbounded consumption vectors
- Cross-user Isolation (agent-product only — required for multi-tenant)
- Supply Chain (LLM03) — model version pinning, MCP server hash pinning, prompt template tampering, vector DB poisoning
Plus the severity rating + sign-off table. Critical/High threats must transition from __pending__ → mitigated (with specific control reference) before you sign off. accepted (residual risk) requires CTO countersign in PROJECT.md.
Workflow
After the base Step-0 read-inputs, pull the ARCH context your domain needs: ## Trust Boundaries, ## LLM Scope, and the tool/action/integration list. Read the pack for archetype-specific gates:
skills/great_cto/packs/agent-pack.mdfor agent-product (irreversible-action heuristic, MCP server trust pattern, multi-identity model, output filter, per-user rate limits)skills/great_cto/packs/ai-pack.mdfor ai-system (eval frameworks, prompt-engineering hygiene, RAG poisoning vectors)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago Changed 0b03e9de7ce5
- 8d ago Changed · -42 tokens per session 6d27291fa534
- 11d ago First seen · 182 lines · 85 tokens per session scan C abaad9694ee0
ai-security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository avelikiy/great_cto (92 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 2,585 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (instruction-override phrasing, cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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