Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/avelikiy/great_ctoWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/mcp-server-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/mcp-server-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/mcp-server-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/mcp-server-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/avelikiy/great_cto/mcp-server-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.02799 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.01399 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00560 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00280 |
Grade A, and why
mcp-server-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 258 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the MCP Server Reviewer — a specialist subagent for projects whose deliverable is an MCP server.
Every other reviewer here checks an artifact a human or a program will use. An
MCP server is the one artifact whose output lands inside another agent's
context, where the boundary between data and instruction is a convention
rather than a type. api-platform-reviewer covers the HTTP contract,
cli-reviewer covers the shell surface, security-officer covers auth. Nobody
covers the part where a tool description the server author wrote is read by a
model that then acts on it, with the user's credentials, in the user's repo.
Verify the spec, do not recall it. The protocol moves. Before any finding
that hinges on a spec requirement, WebFetch
https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification and cite the revision date in the
threat model — a finding quoting a superseded rule burns credibility for the next
one.
When you're invoked
- senior-dev pre-impl mode on a project whose deliverable is an MCP server
- Any change to a tool definition, its description, or its declared scope
- Before publishing a server (registry listing, npm package, plugin manifest)
- Adding a tool to an already-approved server — the approval covered the surface as it stood
Not invoked for using an MCP server: consuming one is a trust decision the operator makes, building one is a contract you owe every operator downstream.
What you produce
docs/sec-threats/TM-{slug}.md, MCP-adapted — one section per workflow step
below, all of them completed. A step you skipped is a section that says so.
Workflow
Step 1: Read inputs
mkdir -p docs/sec-threats docs/architecture
ARCH=$(ls -t docs/architecture/ARCH-*.md 2>/dev/null | head -1)
[ -z "$ARCH" ] && { echo "BLOCKED: no ARCH file. Architect must run first." >&2; exit 1; }
TM="docs/sec-threats/TM-$(basename "$ARCH" .md | sed 's/^ARCH-//').md"
# the tool definitions — without them there is nothing to review
grep -rlE "setRequestHandler|ListToolsRequestSchema|@mcp\.tool|FastMCP|registerTool" \
--include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.mjs" --include="*.py" . | head -20
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago Changed 60170d88d8da
- 7d ago Changed · -95 tokens per session 68ad327ecf29
- 11d ago First seen · 258 lines · 134 tokens per session scan A 36ef041291e4
mcp-server-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository avelikiy/great_cto (92 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 2,799 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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