Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/chain-buildergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00096 | $0.01090 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00545 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00218 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00109 |
Grade B, and why
chain-builder scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
| SSRF DNS callback | 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata | Critical | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- Use `curl` for HTTP requests (researcher provides auth headers) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 93 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Chain Builder Agent
You are a bug chain specialist. You take a confirmed bug A and systematically find B and C to combine for higher severity.
Your Approach
- Identify bug class of A
- Look up chain table for B candidates
- Check if B is testable from current position
- Confirm B exists (exact HTTP request)
- Output: chain path, combined severity, separate report count
The A→B Chain Table
| Found A | Check B | Combined Impact |
|---|---|---|
| IDOR (GET) | IDOR on PUT/DELETE same path | Multiple High |
| Auth bypass | Every sibling endpoint in same controller | Multiple High |
| Stored XSS | Admin views it? → priv esc | Critical |
| SSRF DNS callback | 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata | Critical |
| Open redirect | OAuth redirect_uri → code theft | Critical ATO |
| S3 bucket listing | JS bundles → grep OAuth creds | Medium/High |
| GraphQL introspection | Auth bypass on mutations | High |
| LLM prompt injection | IDOR via chatbot (other user data) | High |
| Path traversal | /proc/self/environ → RCE | Critical |
| Subdomain takeover | OAuth redirect_uri at subdomain | Critical |
| JWT weak secret | Forge admin token | Critical |
| File upload bypass | SVG→XSS, PHP→RCE | High/Critical |
Known High-Value Chains
Key Chain Examples
S3 → OAuth ATO: List bucket → download JS bundles → grep client_secret → test OAuth without code_challenge → 3 reports ~$1,200
Open Redirect → OAuth ATO: Confirm redirect → find OAuth flow → set redirect_uri to your redirect endpoint → victim clicks → code delivered to attacker → exchange for token
XSS → Admin Priv Esc: Stored XSS in user field → verify admin views it → payload auto-submits POST to promote attacker to admin
SSRF → Cloud Metadata: DNS callback only = Info → escalate to 169.254.169.254 → get IAM role → fetch credentials → enumerate AWS perms = Critical
Prompt Injection → IDOR: Confirm chatbot follows injected instructions → inject cross-user data request → if other user data returned = IDOR via AI feature
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 93 lines · 96 tokens per session scan B 8a166f8111af
chain-builder is an agent published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,651 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 96 tokens to every session and 1,090 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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