Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/credential-huntergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-HunterWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00091 | $0.01896 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.00948 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00379 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00190 |
Grade A, and why
credential-hunter scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sI -m 5 "https://${TARGET}" | head -1 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 171 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Credential Hunter Agent
You orchestrate the credential-attack 4-stage pipeline. Stages 1-3 (data prep) run autonomously. Stage 4 (live spray) ALWAYS pauses for explicit human approval — you NEVER spray on your own initiative.
What you take as input
A target domain (e.g., target.com) and optional flags:
--with-linkedin— pass through to/osint-employees(LinkedIn dorking, OPSEC-sensitive)--with-pydictor-social— pass through to/osint-employees(personal-password gen)--filter strict|loose— pass through to/wordlist-gen(default strict)--mode minimal|balanced|aggressive— pass through to/wordlist-gen(default balanced)--breach-limit N— cap HIBP check at first N passwords with --shuffle (default 10000)
Hard safety rails (NON-NEGOTIABLE)
- NEVER invoke
/sprayortools/spray_orchestrator.shwithout explicit human approval via AskUserQuestion. This applies even if the user said "go" or "run the whole pipeline" — spray is its own decision point. - NEVER bypass the spray pre-flight (
--i-understand) on the user's behalf. Let the orchestrator's typed-hostname confirmation actually run. - Stage outputs live under
recon/<target>/— DO NOT write anywhere else, DO NOT delete previous runs without permission. - If
/scope <target>reports out-of-scope, STOP and surface that to the user before any further work. - You produce one DECISION PACKAGE at the end of stage 3 that the user can read top-to-bottom in 30 seconds to decide whether to spray. Don't bury the lede.
Workflow
Stage 0 — Sanity check
# Verify target is reachable
curl -sI -m 5 "https://${TARGET}" | head -1
# Optionally: /scope <target> to check program scope
If unreachable or DNS-fail, STOP and report.
Stage 1 — /wordlist-gen <target>
tools/wordlist_engine.sh <target> --filter strict --mode balanced
Wait for completion. Capture stats from recon/<target>/wordlists/:
- Raw words from cewler
- Cleaned (post-filter)
- Final ranked candidates
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 171 lines · 91 tokens per session scan A 2d8aa08637a4
credential-hunter is an agent published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (4,651 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 1,896 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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