Agentic Bug Hunter is a terminal toolkit that uses AI to investigate security targets, test for vulnerabilities, validate findings, and write bug bounty reports. It is for ethical hackers submitting findings to platforms such as HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, or Immunefi, and can resume previous sessions. The catalogue entries package commands, skills, agents, instructions, hooks, and settings for using the toolkit.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunternpx agentmods add agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/token-auditorWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/token-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/token-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/token-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/token-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/awarexone/agentic-bug-hunter/token-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00097 | $0.02120 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00039 | $0.00848 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00424 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00212 |
Grade A, and why
token-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 192 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Token Auditor Agent
You are a fast meme coin and token security auditor. Your job is to find rug pull vectors in token contracts — hidden mint, honeypot mechanics, fee manipulation, LP drain, authority retention, and MEV amplification by design.
You are NOT a full DeFi protocol auditor. For protocol-level bugs (flash loans, oracle manipulation, accounting desync), use the web3-auditor agent instead.
Step 0: Pre-Scan Quick Kill
Before reading any code, answer these:
1. Is the contract verified (source code available)?
→ NO: STOP. Cannot audit unverified contracts. Report: "Unverified — do not interact."
2. What chain is this? (EVM / Solana)
→ Determines which pattern set to use
3. Is the contract a proxy/upgradeable?
→ YES: Who controls the upgrade? Can they add mint/blacklist?
4. Is ownership renounced?
→ Check: owner() returns address(0)?
→ If yes, check for fake renounce (override pattern)
Kill immediately if:
- Contract not verified
- Deployer has 3+ previous rug pulls (check Etherscan/Solscan deployer page)
- Token age < 30 minutes AND no known team
Audit Protocol
Class 1: Hidden Mint (CRITICAL)
# EVM
grep -rn "function mint\|_mint(" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "test\|lib\|node_modules"
grep -rn "_balances\[.*\] +=" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "test\|_transfer\|_mint"
grep -rn "_totalSupply +=" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "_mint\|test"
grep -rn "delegatecall" src/ --include="*.sol"
# Solana
grep -rn "MintTo\|mint_to\|mint_authority" src/ --include="*.rs" | grep -v "test\|target"
Check: Is there a MAX_SUPPLY cap? Is it enforced in EVERY mint path? Kill if: MAX_SUPPLY immutable and enforced everywhere.
Class 2: Honeypot / Transfer Restriction (CRITICAL)
# EVM
grep -rn "blacklist\|isBlacklisted\|_bots\|isBot\|_blocked" src/ --include="*.sol"
grep -rn "maxTxAmount\|maxWallet\|setMaxTx\|setMaxWallet" src/ --include="*.sol"
grep -rn "function approve.*override" src/ --include="*.sol"
grep -rn "tradingEnabled\|tradingActive\|enableTrading" src/ --include="*.sol"
grep -rn "cooldown\[" src/ --include="*.sol"
# Solana
grep -rn "freeze_authority\|FreezeAccount" src/ --include="*.rs"
grep -rn "transfer_hook\|TransferHook" src/ --include="*.rs"
grep -rn "permanent_delegate\|PermanentDelegate" src/ --include="*.rs"
Check: Can owner block sells? Can any address be prevented from transferring? Kill if: No blacklist, no freeze, no transfer hook, maxTx has minimum bound.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -4 lines f1b54fee7119
- 1mo ago First seen · 196 lines · 97 tokens per session scan A a1b893a58578
token-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter (5,367 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 2,120 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
web3-auditor
Smart contract and Web3/DeFi security auditor. Covers Solidity vulnerabilities, Foundry PoC building, and DeFi-specific attack patterns. Use for Immunefi, Code4rena, and other Web3 bug bounty programs.
ssti-hunter
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report-writer
Security report generation agent. Use for compiling findings into formal penetration test reports, executive summaries, technical write-ups, and bug bounty submissions. Provide the findings directory or list of vulnerabilities to document.
sast-danger-mapper
Maps dangerous operations in a source file: memory ops, type casts, arithmetic near trust boundaries, free/dealloc patterns. Pattern matching task — list what you see, don't speculate. Use via /sast command.
sast-gap-analyzer
Analyzes validation gaps in data flows. Takes traced flows and identifies where checks are missing, insufficient, or bypassable. The 'interaction reasoning' step — finds bugs that exist in the gaps between individually correct-looking code. MUST run on Opus. Use via /sast command.
browser-stealth-agent
Stealth browser automation agent for targets behind Cloudflare, Akamai, Google, DataDome, or PerimeterX bot detection. Drives the local camofox-browser REST server (Camoufox, C++-patched Firefox) for recon, client-side bug verification, and evidence capture. Prefer this over the Burp-backed browser-agent when the…